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THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS: 
PROPERTI IN THE TRANSITION 
FROM MARX TO MARKETS 
Michael A. Heller· 
Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty, while street kiosks in front are flill of 
goods? In this Article, Professor Heller develops a theory of anticommons property to help 
explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be 
understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, 
multiple owners are each endowed with the priVilege to use a given resource, and 110 one 
has the right to exclude another. When too many owners hold such privileges of lise, the 
resource is prone to overuse - a tragedy of the commons. Depleted fisheries and 
overgrazed fields are canonical examples of this familiar tragedy. In an anticommons, 
according to this Article, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When too many 
owners hold such rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the 
anticommons. Empty Moscow storefronts are a canonical example of the tragedy of 
underuse. Anticommons property may appear whenever governments define new property 
rights in both post-socialist and developed market economies. Once an anticommons 
emerges, collecting rights into usable private property bundles can be brutal and slow. The 
difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that policymakers should 
pay more attention to the content of property bundles, rather than focusing just on the 
clairty of rights. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Socialist rule stifled markets and often left store shelves bare. One promise of the transition "from Marx to markets"l was that new en-
trepreneurs would acquire the stores, create businesses, and fill the 
shelves.2 However, after several years of reform, storefronts often re-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Lisa Bernstein, Bob Ellick-
son, Merritt Fox, Rick Hills, Don Herzog, Avery Katz, Mark Kelman, Jim Krier, Rick Lempert, 
Kyle Logue, Deborah Malamud, Bill Miller, Mancur Olson, Eric Orts, Rick Pildes, Carol Rose, 
Warren Schwartz, Ted Sims, Ted Snyder, Nilanjana Sarkar, Michael 'frebilcock, and participants 
in workshops and conferences at Iowa, Georgetown, Michigan, Stanford, and Toronto Law 
Schools; Michigan and Wharton Business Schools; and the annual meetings of the American Po-
litical Science Association and the American Law and Economics Association. Thanks to Alex 
Choe, Ben Schwartz, and Michael Sherman for research assistance; Kathleen Wilson for editorial 
assistance; and Gail Ristow for secretarial support. The University of Michigan Law School Cook 
Fund provided generous research support. 
1 Bob Ellickson and I developed and co-taught qFrom Marx to Markets" as a seminar at Yale 
Law School in 1991. I teach an eponymous seminar at Michigan. Variations on the term have 
been widely used in describing transition. See, e.g., Economists (Should) RIlle, OK, ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 14, 1993, at 19, 19 C'[T]he law of the market is replacing that of Marx or the military.''). 
2 Paralleling the conventional usage, this Article uses the terms "transition" and "transition 
regimes" to refer to the 28 post-socialist societies that have adopted some market-oriented reforms, 
but which one cannot yet describe as fully formed market economies. See FROM PLAN TO 
MARKET: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, 1996, at ix [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
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mained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, mush-
roomed up on Moscow streets. Why did new merchants not come in 
from the cold? 
Property theorists offer partial explanations for this puzzle of empty 
stores and full kiosks, citing the ambiguity of new rights, local govern-
ment corruption, and the lack of a legal infrastructure.3 This Article 
argues that, even if the initial endowment of property rights were 
clearly defined, corruption held in check, and the rule of law respected, 
storefronts would remain empty because of the way governments are 
creating property rights. Transition regimes have often failed to endow 
any individual with a bundle of rights that ,represents full ownership of 
storefronts or other scarce resources.4 Instead, those regimes have rati-
fied the expectations of powerful socialist-era stakeholders by making 
them rights-holders in the new economy. Rights were made alienable in 
the hope that new owners would trade them to more productive users.5 
In a typical Moscow storefront, one owner may be endowed initially 
with the right to sell, another to receive sale revenue, and still others to 
lease, receive lease revenue, occupy, and determine use.6 Each owner 
can block the others from using the space as a storefront. Noone can 
set up shop without collecting the consent of all of the other owners. 
Empty Moscow storefronts are a stark example of anticommons 
property,7 a type of property regime that may result when initial en-
dowments are created as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent 
bundles of rights in scarce resources.S More generally, one can under-
stand anticommons property as the mirror image of commons property. 
In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with 
REpORT] (listing 10 countries in Central and Eastern Europe; 15 newly independent states for-
merly in the Soviet Union; and China, Vietnam, and Mongolia). 
3 See generally ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIvATIZATION IN EASTERN 
EUROPE: Is THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? 170 (1994) (commenting on the essential role of the 
state and the legal system in a private property regime); Cheryl W. Gray, Rebecca J. Hanson & Mi-
chael Heller, Hungarian Legal Refonnfor the Private Sector, 26 GEO. WASH. J. !NT'L L. & ECON. 
293,303-05 (1992) (noting the slow transition from state to private property ownership in the Hun-
garian legal system); Andrei Shleifer, Establishing Property Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORLD BANK ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 93, 95, 104 (1994) (dis-
cussing problems in establishing secure property rights in transition regimes). 
4 This Article draws on the familiar image of property as a "bundle of rights," in which each 
right represents the relation between two actors over the use and control of a scarce resource. See 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 69 (1980) (recognizing the modem 
view of property as a "bundle of rights"). 
5 The viability of the idea of a "standard" bundle of rights and the equally controversial idea of 
"normal" use of property is discussed below in note 228. This Article uses such terms descriptively 
by reference to analogous market legal systems. 
6 See infra section II.B (discussing Moscow storefront case study). 
7 Frank Michelman appears to have coined the term "anticommons." See infra Part m (dis-
cussing the fleeting appearance in property theory literature of the anticommons and developing a 
more useful definition). 
8 See infra pp. 65 I, 656, 672 (distinguishing a legal anticommons in storefronts from a spatial 
anticommons in communal apartments). 
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the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude 
another.9 When too many owners have such privileges of use, the re-
source is prone to overuse - a tragedy of the commons. 10 Canonical 
examples include depleted fisheries, overgrazed fields, and polluted air. 
In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each en-
dowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no 
one has an effective privilege of use. 11 When there are too many owners 
holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a trag-
edy of the anticommons.12 Legal and economic scholars have mostly 
overlooked this tragedy, but it can appear whenever governments create 
new property rights. 13 This Article proposes empty Moscow storefronts 
as a canonical example of the tragedy of underuse. 
9 A commons is "a scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing privilege[,] •.. a type of 
regime that is opposite to [private property]." Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the 
Law of Property, in 24 NOMOS 3, 9 (1982). This vocabulary of privileges of use and rights of exclll-
sion tracks Hohfeld's terms for describing legal relations, which are now commonly used in prop-
erty theory. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 96-97 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 
1923). In this context, "'rights' meanO that others are legally required to leave the object alone 
save as the owner may permit, and ..• 'privileges' meanO that the owner is legally free to do with 
the object as he or she wills." Michelman, supra, at5. 
10 The literature on the tragedy of the commons is vast. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The 7ragedy 
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (introducing the term); ELINOR OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
182-84 (1990) (discussing applications of the tragedy of the commons and showing sustainable in-
formal management of commons resources). 
11 The initial endowment of competing rights discussed here differs from the voluntary frag-
mentation of bundles in private property regimes. Market legal systems allow owners to break up 
property bundles, but also have rules that usually operate both to create clear decision makers over 
objects and to limit extreme fragmentation of rights. See inf,-a pp. 665, 671-72 (discussing allow-
able fragmentation in private property regimes). 
In conversation with the author, Carol Rose notes that common law countries such as the 
United States have developed elaborate mechanisms that accommodate desires for changing uses 
and that prevent anticommons property from emerging. For example, modem condominium law 
often uses majority voting to prevent individuals from blocking change. Also, joint owners can 
always partition commonly held property. See JOHN E. CRlBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY II4 (Jd ed. 1989). Many states require recording cove-
nants periodically to keep them in force, a rule that helps extinguish low-value rights. See id. at 
392. But cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) (holding escheat of low-value devise and de-
scent interests in allocated Native American lands to be an unconstitutional taking); infra section 
rv.D (discussing Hodel). 
12 How do players behave in a game in which each holds rights to veto, rather than the more 
familiar models in which each player has a privilege of use? It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
develop a formal economic model that distinguishes anticommons behavior from closely related 
collective action problems and evaluates strategies to overcome anticommons tragedy. 
13 Andrei Shleifer has described the issue: 
The literature on poorly defined property rights has focused on the common pool prob-
lem .... It explores how a society moves from a situation in which a forest is common prop-
erty, to one of reasonably well-defined communal property rights, to one in which the gov-
ernment enforces property rights .... 
But in Eastern Europe assets are already too valuable to remain common property, and 
well-defined control structures govern the use of these assets. These control structures give 
politicians enormous control rights over all assets, including private assets that are politi-
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The main goal of this Article is to introduce the anticommons as a 
useful new tool for property theory; a subsidiary goal is to show how 
awareness of anticommons tragedy may help inform legal policymak-
ing. Part IT presents an empirical study of the creation and resolution of 
anticommons property across a range of property in transition. The 
Russian government did not intentionally create anticommons property. 
For the most part, new rights track the ways that people want to use re-
sources. But not always. Governments can create too many property 
rights and too many decisionmakers who can block use. 14 The empiri-
cal material in this Part shows how, once an anticommons emerges, 
collecting rights into usable private property bundles can be brutal and 
slow. IS 
Part ill defines anticommons property more precisely and situates 
the term in a property theory framework. This Part shows how com-
mons and anticommons property can operate symmetrically. Neither 
would be tragic in a theoretical world of costless transactions, because 
people could trade their initial endowments until resources were put to 
their highest-valued uses.16 In practice, close-knit communities may 
develop informal norms and institutions to manage resources and avoid 
tragedy.17 Often, however, efficient bargains fail because transaction 
cally controlled through regulation. [These politicians] use their control rights to produce 
inefficient outcomes that serve their personal goals . 
. . . In a transition economy the problem of establishing property rights largely comes 
down to shrinking the range of political control. 
Shleifer, supra note 3, at 98-100 (citations omitted); see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the 
State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. EcoN. PERSP. 87, 98 (1996) ("The ab-
sence of a workable system of legal entitlements has clearly played a retarding role in the growth of 
small businesses in Russia. Many new Russian businesses operate out of kiosks and other tempo-
rary structures, while existing real estate is woefully underutilized.'~. 
14 In the storefront example, the government lacks the resources to buy back and re-bundle 
poorly designed rights and is unwilling to undermine the credibility of market reforms by taking 
rights without payment. Frank Michelman has elaborated on this dilemma through his oft-cited 
distinction between "settlement" and "demoralization" costs. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical F01tndations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REv. II6S, 1214-18 (1967). 
15 In some cases, informal norms emerge to routinize bundling of rights, and rights-bundling 
entrepreneurs buy or bully their way into control. In other cases, however, holdouts by anticom-
mons owners, high transaction costs, and cognitive biases block bundling. See infra p. 674. 
16 See RH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I, 2-8 (1960). Coase's model 
overlooks cognitive biases, such as wealth and framing effects, that would prevent a single efficient 
outcome even in the case of no transaction costs. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of 
Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 385-
91 (1991). 
17 Carol Rose, Elinor Ostrom, and others have shown how people sometimes develop informal 
norms and institutions to manage commons property efficiently. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 10, 
at 182-84; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 7II (1986). In addition, locking multiple users together may reinforce 
communitarian values and help people learn to work together. See id. at 774-77. These insights 
on the potential for informal coordination and the non-utilitarian value of overlapping ownership 
apply with similar force on the anticommons end of the property spectrum. Whether anticommons 
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costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases defeat informal negotiaM 
tions, and communities of owners are not close-knit.1s When markets 
fail to rearrange initial endowments, resources can become stuck in 
low-value uses at either end of the property rights spectrum. Whether 
this misallocation takes the form of overuse in a commons or underuse 
in an anticommons, the economic waste of scarce resources results. PriM 
vatizing a commons and bundling an anticommons can solve the trageM 
dies of misuse by better aligning individual incentives with social welM 
fare. 19 
Part IV briefly applies the anticommons idea to puzzles beyond RusM 
sian real property transition. Governments may create anticommons 
property in developed market economies, as well as in transition counM 
tries. In the United States, vivid examples appear at the frontiers of 
Native American law and intellectual property protection.20 Whether 
anticommons tragedy emerges in a developed or transition economy, 
and whether it lasts for a short or long period, societies can avoid its SOM 
cial costs by creating more coherent initial endowments. The difficulM 
ties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property 
theorists and policymakers should pay more attention to the content of 
property bundles,21 rather than focusing just on the clarity of rights.22 
ownership of a partiCUlar resource results in tragedy depends in part on people's ability to cooper-
ate informally - an empirical question rather than a theoretical question. See infra pp. 674-75. 
18 See RH. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 174 (1988) ("The world of zero 
transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. It is the world of modem economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists 
to leave."). 
19 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory oj Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350-53 (1967) (describing how development of private property can solve the tragedy of the com-
mons); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 29-II4 (1989) (ana-
lyzing empirical examples of Demsetz's proposition). Numerous scholars have expanded and 
challenged Demsetz's original insights. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: 
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 3 (1991) (distinguishing closed- from open-access commons); 
OSTROM, supra note 10, at 182-84. 
20 See infra section IV.D (discussing an anticommons in Native American allotted lands). In a 
forthcoming article, Rebecca Eisenberg and the author of this Article show how the recent prolif-
eration of patent rights in basic biomedical research may lead paradoxically to fewer useful phar-
maceutical products and procedures in the United States. A tragedy of the anticommons may be 
the unintended consequence of privatizing basic biomedical research. See Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Upstream Patents and Downstream Products: A Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons? 1-2 (Oct. II, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School Library). 
21 Mancur Olson suggests that his concept of "indivisibilities" helps explain the importance of 
the content of property bundles. He writes that the anticommons "is really about parcels of rights 
to indivisible assets that, especially given the other legal imperfections, are not even valuable 
enough to justify the transactions needed to put together a unified package of rights to the indivisi-
ble asset." Letter from Mancur Olson, Professor, University of Maryland at College Park, to the 
author I (Mar. 13, 1997) (on file with Harvard Law School Library); see Mancur Olson, Toward a 
Unified View oj Economics and the Other Social Sciences, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 212, 217-26 Games E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990). 
22 Advice on clarifying property rights in transition has become a cottage industry for Western 
legal advisers and academics. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 44-65, 87-
97 (discussing property rights and legal institutions); Gianmaria Ajani & Ugo Mattei, Codi/yirlg 
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II. THE GRADIENT OF PROPERTY IN TRANSITION 
This Part introduces the Moscow storefront as a paradigm of an an-
ticommons. Section II.A sets the legal stage and proposes an explana-
tion for the link between bundling of rights and economic performance. 
Section II.B details transition in Moscow storefronts. Finally, Section 
II.C contrasts the dynamics of anticommons property in related empiri-
cal settings. 
A. Defining the Gradient of Property 
I. Key Elements of Socialist Law. - Socialist legal systems organ-
ized property in a fundamentally different way from private property 
systems.23 For example, socialist law did not have the legal concept of 
"real estate."24 One could not point to a sharply defined piece of real es-
tate and say that it belonged to a particular entity. Instead, the state 
owned all land - the "hard core of state property"25 - indivisibly with 
no right of alienation.26 For administrative convenience, the govern-
ment allocated complex use rights to state organizations.27 Structures 
such as buildings had a somewhat different legal regime: state organiza-
tions could transfer structures among themselves but could not alienate 
them to private individuals.28 Conflicts among users of state property 
were resolved through a dispute-settlement mechanism that accorded 
primacy to state socialist expediency, rather than to abstract legal prin-
Property Law in the Process of Transition: Some Suggestionsjrom Comparative Law and Econom-
ics, 19 HASTINGS lNT'L & COMPo L. REv. II7, II7-18 (1995); Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Le-
gal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 35, 38-39 (1994); Paul H. 
Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. I, 1-7 
(1994); Michael HeUer & April L. Harding, Action Plan - Development of Commercial Real Es-
tate Market 1-3 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School Library). 
23 See Gray, Hanson & HeUer, supra note 3, at 303-<>5. Many solid works detail the Soviet legal 
system and socialist law of property. See, e.g., GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, JR., THE SOVIET LAW 
OF PROPERTY 6 (1983); W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 169-76 (1983); F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, 
RUSSIAN LAW: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW 229-46 (1993). This 
section touches on only those elements of the socialist legal system that set up the anticommons 
argument and leaves for another day a more nuanced explanation of why socialist systems divided 
property as they did. 
24 "Soviet law traditionally did not distinguish between real and personal (or immovable and 
movable) property. State ownership of land made it unnecessary to pay attention to real property 
as such." FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 245. In the United States, "real property" and its syno-
nym "real estate" are defined as "[l]and and anything permanently affixed to the land." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (6th ed. 1990). The term "real estate" first appeared in post-Soviet Russian 
statutes in the Law of the Russian Federation on Basic Principles of the Federal Housing Policy 
(Dec. 24, 1992) (translation on file with Harvard Law School Library); see also William G. Frenkel, 
Private Land Ownership in Russia: An Overview of Legal Developments to Date, 3 PARKER SCH. 
J.E. EUR. L. 257, 287 (1996) (describing the Russian law). 
2S FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 247. 
26 See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 253. 
27 See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 243-44. 
28 See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 170. 
o 
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ciples.29 Socialist governments did not maintain the ordinary mecha-
nisms that market legal systems use to distinguish one plot of land from 
another. Because no land markets existed, no need arose for maintain-
ing market legal tools such as land registries.30 
The absence of real estate as a legal category suggests three elements 
that distinguished socialist property laws from market legal systems and 
set the stage for the emergence of an anticommons: 
(a) Hierarchy of Property. - Whereas market legal systems tend to 
dichotomize among types of property (for example, real and personal, or 
tangible and intangible) and to focus on the scope of individual rights, 
socialist law categorized property according to the identity of the 
owner.31 Socialist law erected a hierarchy based on the level of protec-
tion afforded property held by different owners.32 At the top was state 
socialist property, which received the most protection.33 Next came co-
operative property, which received similar but somewhat less protec-
tion.34 Personal property received still less protection.3S The residual 
29 See id. at lIS (stating that the system was "created to settle economic disputes between so-
cialist enterprises, institutions, and organisations with the object of strengthening socialist legality, 
planning discipline, production efficiency, and product quality"}. 
30 Working for the World Bank in the early 1990S, I was often asked by government officials in 
transition countries to help identify priorities for land and housing reform. I always placed cre-
ation of property registries among the highest reform priorities because of their role in clarifying 
ownership, securing mortgage finance, and enabling property taxation. 
William Frenkel has also recognized this issue: 
One problem arising from land acquisition through privatization has been the inadequate 
description of the boundaries of land occupied by state enterprises .•.. The issue of 
boundaries is important because, in the absence of maps or other documentation which 
clearly show the land boundaries, the land is allocated on the basis of "actual use of the tract 
of land," forcing the boundaries to be determined administratively. 
Frenkel, supra note 24, at 290. 
31 See CHERYL W. GRAY, WORLD BANK, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 209, EVOLVING LEGAl. 
FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 3 
(1993); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 88. This hierarchy is an artifact of so-
cialist law, which does not map well onto market property law dichotomies, for example real and 
personal property, or property theory categories, for example, state, commons, and private prop-
erty. 
32 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 88. 
33 Assets under state socialist ownership included property specifically owned by the state, 
land, and natural resources. See VIKTOR P. MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEMPORARY 
RUSSIA 10 (1993). State socialist property "could not be used as security or exacted in recovery of 
creditors' claims." ld. at II. State property that had been socialist was inalienable, and if alien-
ated could be recovered from whomever had acquired it. The supremacy of state property was 
complete: the State Planning Committee, State Pricing Committee, and other ministries and de-
partments could take any decision they saw fit, without regard to rights of owners. See id. at II-
12; see also BUTLER, supra note 23, at 169-70 (describing socialist ownership in the Soviet Union). 
34 Cooperative property differed from socialist property in that it belonged indivisibly to a dis-
tinct group of citizens. See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 170; MOZOLIN, supra note 33, at la-II. 
35 Personal property served personal needs such as family houses and apartments, vacation 
homes, cars, furniture, or clothes. See MOZOLIN, supra note 33, at 10. Personal property was the 
only freely transferable category, but prohibitions that often made its entreprenurial use an eco-
nomic crime limited marketability. See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 174-75. Under Article 107 of 
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, and analogous articles of the civil codes of the other So-
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 629 1997-1998
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category of private property was abolished altogether in the Soviet Un-
ion; the rest of the socialist world gave it the least protection from taxa-
tion, regulation, and confiscation.36 
(b) Objects of Socialist Property. - Within the category of socialist 
property, which included the objects of greatest economic value in so-
cialist society, the state defined the boundaries of objects in ways that 
are unfamiliar in market legal systems. Because all productive assets 
were in principle "unitary" and belonged to "the people as a whole," so-
cialist law did not delineate the ordinary physical and legal boundaries 
of private property.37 Concretely, there was often no record of the line 
dividing land between two buildings.38 In the early years of the transi-
tion from socialism, private owners and public officials often could not 
answer the question, "Who controls the land on which we stand?" 
(c) Ownership of Socialist Property. - Instead of assigning an 
owner to each object, socialist law created a complex hierarchy of di-
vided and coordinated rights in the objects it defined.39 These owner-
ship and control rights varied among socialist 'countries, but one can 
loosely compare them to Western forms of trust ownership.40 The law 
integrated ownership of physical assets within overlapping state struc-
tures, often linking upward from a state enterprise, to a group of similar 
enterprises, to the local and then central offices of a ministry responsible 
for that branch of industry.41 Central-planning mechanisms coordi-
nated uses; state arbitration courts, formally, and the Communist Party, 
informally, resolved conflicts.42 
Thus, the most valuable assets in socialist countries began the tran-
sition to markets with indistinct boundaries and overlapping owner-
ship. To create private property that owners could trade in markets, 
viet republics, the government could confiscate any dwelling houses that a family owned above the 
allowable one house. See id. at 175; MOZOLIN, supra note 33, at II. An owner could not recover 
personal property acquired by a bona fide purchaser unless lost, stolen, or otherwise taken against 
the owner's will. See id. Additionally, socialist law provided less strict penalties for stealing per-
sonal property than socialist property. See id. at 12. 
36 Private property was individually owned means of production, and the socialist world often 
severely restricted or eliminated it. See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 170-72. 
37 GRAY, supra note 31, at3; see also Gray, Hanson & Heller, supra note 3, at 310-I1 (describing 
problems in determining legal title for privately owned Hungarian property). 
38 See Gray, Hanson & Heller, supra note 3, at 3I1. 
39 See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 253 ("An enormous complex of State agencies are concerned 
with the conservation of each resource and employ hundreds of inspectorates at all levels of State 
administration.,,); Viktor Knapp, Socialist Countries, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW §§ 2-79 to 2-84, at 48-52 (Frederick H. Lawson ed., 1975) (explaining the 
scope of the right of "operational administration" under socialist law). 
40 In Russia, for example, multiple state institutions were sometimes given overlapping rights of 
"operational administration" in assets. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 236-37. 
41 See BUTLER, supra note 23, at 225-33. 
42 See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 204, 20~9. 
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transition reformers first had to break down the socialist regime.43 
Across the socialist world, the task of eliminating socialist property law 
generally involved addressing the three elements discussed above.44 
'fransition regimes eliminated the hierarchy of property, made property 
legally divisible and alienable, and put private ownership on an equal 
footing with state ownership.45 'fransition reformers also began to redeM 
fine owners and objects in terms analogous to those of market econoM 
mies.46 Following these initial steps to dismantle socialist legal regimes, 
subsequent reforms began to develop new market legal systems in the 
hope of generating well-functioning private-property relations.47 
2. The Gradient of Property: Protection and Peiformance. - When 
property is organized along the hierarchy of socialist legal protection, a 
43 The literature on transition from socialism is extensive. For a useful, annotated bibliography 
on the speed and sequencing of reforms, see WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, cited above in note 
2, at 149. As one article noted: 
"The mechanisms of the command economy were dismantled everywhere with surprising 
speed," said Peter Havlik, [deputy director of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Eco-
nomic Studies.] On the other hand, the formation of new institutions has turned out to be 
much more difficult, slower and more painful than most analysts had expected at the outset 
of reforms in 1990. 
Jane Perlez, Fast and Slow Lanes on the Capitalist Road, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at AI. 
44 In many transition countries, a major part of transition has been the restitution of property 
expropriated from pre-Communist owners. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 
59. Rights acquired under such programs could contribute to anticommons phenomena. Russia 
has not opened the restitution issue, perhaps because there is no living memory of pre-I9I7 owner-
ship. 
4S See GRAY, supra note 31, at 4; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 88-89. 
China and Vietnam are exceptions in that they still formally assert the primacy of state propertyj 
although they now broadly allow long-term leases of property by private individuals. See id. at 89. 
46 In 1990, Russia first provided for municipal property and made all property forms equal in 
status. See Law on Private Property of the RSFSR (Dec. 24, 1990), translated in RUSSIA & THE 
REpUBLICS: LEGAL MATERIALS Q"ohn Hazard & Vratislav Pechotaeds., 1996). Resolution 3020 of 
the Supreme Soviet, "On the Delimitation of State Property," enacted in 1991, defined the catego-
ries of property to be assigned to each level of government. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 
238 (discussing the coverage of the Russian ownership law); APRIL L. HARDING, WORLD BANKj 
COFINANCING & FINANCIAL ADVISORY SERVICES DISCUSSION PAPER No. 109, COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA 6 (1995) (briefly discussing Resolution 3020). 
Other countries went through a similar process. For example, in Hungary, Law 14 of 1991 
"abolished all forms of socialist ownership, abrogated privileges of state and cooperative ownership 
as against private ownership, reviewed the range of exclusive state property and inalienable assetsj 
and empowered the state to cede certain property" to private owners. Gray, Hanson & HeUer, su-
pra note 3, at 305.' Act I of 1987 on Land, as amended through 1991, then helped create a private 
real estate market, in part by derming land and structures as objects of private ownership, and in 
part by eliminating conflicting categories of socialist law such as the "operational administration" 
form of land-holding. I d. at 306 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 The process that socialist systems used to create private property generally foUowed three 
broad steps: decentralization, in which the federal government assigned newly alienable objects to 
state enterprises and to local, regional, and federal government agencies; privatization, in which 
state enterprises and agencies were instructed to transfer most of their property into private con-
trol; and regulation, in which governments began to create the complex regulatory framework 
typicalIy used in market economies both to protect public welfare and to mediate disputes among 
private property owners. See, e.g., id. at 307-08, 3 Io-II. 
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striking and previously unreported trend emerges.48 This section will 
argue that, within a given regime, the more protection property re-
ceived under socialist law, the less successful its performance has been 
in a new market economy.49 It is difficult for existing transition litera-
ture to explain this inverse correlation between protection and perform-
ance.50 For example, the level of administrative corruption, judicial in-
capacity, and clarity of rights is reasonably consistent across types of 
real estate within any given national real property market. Yet residen-
tial real estate, which received relatively less protection under socialist 
law, appears to be performing better than commercial real estate, which 
received relatively more protection.51 
The working hypothesis in this section is that private property 
emerges less successfully in resources that begin transition with the 
most divided ownership. In such resources, poorly performing anti-
commons property is most likely to appear and persist.52 In contrast, 
private property emerges more successfully in resources that begin tran-
sition with a single owner holding a near-standard bundle of market le-
gal rights.53 In such resources, the transition from a socialist to a mar-
ket economy occurs more smoothly (Figure 1).54 
48 This Article abstracts from the significant variations across the 28 transition countries in the 
pace and scope of reforms, the length of time under communism, and the underlying cultural, his-
torical, and legal background. 
49 The measure of "performance" is difficult to quantify given the available data. A comparison 
of Russian assets with similar assets in developed market economIes, however, provides a useful 
proxy for the concept of performance. Simple efficiency-related measures of performance in the 
real estate context could be the trend in vacancy rates, the ratio of rental value or sales prices to 
incomes, and the aggregate value of sectoral resources compared to that of market economies at a 
similar level of economic development. Exploration of distribution-related measures of perform-
ance is also possible. This Article considers performance more in terms of the size of the pie, rather 
than who gets which slice. In other words, it focuses on efficiency, as opposed to distribution. See 
generally WORLD BANK, HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK 71-II2 (1993) (using quanti-
tative indicators to compare housing sector performance across countries). 
50 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. 
51 Compare Raymond J. Struyk, The Long Road to the Market, in ECONOMIC RE-
STRUCTURING OF THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 60 (Raymond J. Struyk ed., 1996) ~'Can households 
with reasonable purchasing power readily buy housing in the market? ... '[y]es' .... True, the 
whole transaction may not be as efficient as in the West, but the system is working .... The clearest 
evidence we have for our assertion of a positive answer comes from the Russian Federation."), with 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 60 ("Reformers [have had] meager success in 
privatizing commercial real estate: no transition economy has yet embarked on a systematic pro-
gram."). 
52 Although private property may perform quite badly in market economies, most resources 
arguably perform better as private property than as anticommons property. See infra Part m.B. 
53 Personal property with the lowest socialist legal protection, such as cars, has been most rap-
idly and successfully transformed into private property. Most cars owned by individuals were 
converted directly to private property; after this change, it was no longer an economic crime to use 
a car for income-producing pUrPoses. Overnight, it became much easier to hail a taxi in Moscow 
because virtually any car would pull over to give one a ride anywhere for a few dollars. 
54 As a caveat, this gradient is an illustration of anticommons dynamics, rather than a compre-
hensive catalog of socialist property. The transition economies' experience with large state enter-
prises, small enterPrises, collective farms, intellectual property, and other types of property could 
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FIGURE I. The Gradient of Property in Transition 
To hold reasonably constant a number of alternative explanatory 
variables, this Article focuses the analysis on four Russian real estate 
examples.55 These examples comprise a more significant portion of na-
tional wealth than observers often realize. For example, in market 
economies, the value of commercial real estate often exceeds the value 
of the industrial plant and equipment.56 Housing is an even larger 
share, accounting for about one-third of reproducible national wealth in 
market economies. 57 
Each point along the gradient of property in transition suggests les-
sons about the nature of anticommons property and possible routes to 
rebundling anticommons property as private property. Property that 
began transition at the top of the gradient, such as Moscow storefronts, 
represents an anticommons in its starkest form. Section II.B explores 
Moscow storefronts.58 The following section will then briefly contrast 
three additional points along the gradient: street kiosks, individual 
.. 
yield additional lessons about anticommons behavior, but falls outside the scope of this Article. 
Section N.A touches briefly on the emergence of anticommons property during privatization of the 
state-owned enterprise sector in transition countries. 
55 This Article suggests that the relationship between protection and performance holds true for 
other countries in transition and for other economic sectors, but proof of this proposition awaits 
further research. See infra section IV.A (discussing enterprise privatization). See generally GRAY, 
supra note 31, at 23-149 (discussing lagging areas of property rights development across Central 
and Eastern Europe); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 50-63 (discussing privati-
zation across a range of assets); Rapaczynski, supra note 13, at 94-102 (discussing property rights 
in the new private sector in transition economies). 
56 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 60. 
57 See id. at 61. 
58 Privatization of stores in Moscow has differed from that elsewhere in Russia. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Barberis, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Natalia Tsukanova, How Does Privatization 
Work? Evidencefrom the Russian Shops, 104 J. POL. ECON .. 764, 783 (1996) (noting that, in Mos-
cow, lobbying by insiders "turned privatization of shops into outright giveaways to the. insiders"), 
To contrast shop privatization in Russia with the experience of shop privatization elsewhere in 
Central Europe, see generally JOHN S. EARLE, ROMAN FRVDMAN, ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI & 
JOEL TuRKEWITZ, SMALL PRIvATIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF RETAIL TRADE AND 
CONSUMER SERVICES IN THE CZECH REpUBUC, HUNGARY, AND POLAND (1994). 
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apartments, and communal apartments (komunalkas). Together, these 
examples provide a sense of the major routes into and out of an anti-
commons. 
B. Case Study of Empty Stores in Moscow 
I. Empty Stores as Anticommons Index. - Stores in socialist re-
gimes were notoriously bare because of an economic policy that disfa-
vored production of consumer goods.59 Although the transition to mar-
kets took root in the early I990S60 and storefronts were privatized, 
many storefronts in Moscow unfortunately remain empty.61 On the 
streets in front of these empty stores, however, new entrepreneurs set up 
thousands of metal kiosks, which they rapidly filled with goods.62 The 
kiosk became a defming icon of transition for casual observers and 
savvy politicians alike.63 The presence of kiosks can be seen as a visual 
59 See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 13. 
60 Redefining property rights is a prolonged process and not easily confined to a single "start" 
date. In Russia, for example, relevant property rights reforms began during the Gorbachev era in 
the mid-198os with glasnost and perestroika and accelerated during the early 1990S. See generally 
I INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD BANK, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT & EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, A STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY 7-18 (1991) (providing a detailed appraisal 
of the Soviet economy before its dissolution). In Russia, the creation of anticommons property can 
be dated perhaps to the 1990 Law on Private Property, cited above in note 46, and the Law on L0-
cal Self-Government in the RSFSR Q"uly 6, 1991), which decentralized state socialist property 
ownership to local and republic governments and agencies. 
By contrast, transitions in the political or economic arenas may be charted more easily. One 
such political transition is the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. See PETER MARCUSE, MISSING 
MARx: A PERSONAL AND POUTICAL JOURNAL OF A YEAR IN EAST GERMANY, 1989-1990, at 81 
(1991). On the economic side, start dates for transition can be similarly traced to dramatic events 
such as freeing prices or ending wage controls. See generally Peter Murrell, The Transition Accord-
ing to Cambridge, Mass., 33 J. ECON. LIT. 164 (1995) (reviewing literature on the economic aspects 
of transition). 
61 See Rapaczynski, supra note 13, at 98. Hard data on store vacancies by city or region are not 
available for the period under discussion in this Article. The common understanding of wide-
spread vacancies is thus largely impressionistic, rather than the result of survey data. See, e.g., id. 
Note that well-functioning market economies normally have a certain level of vacancies, but va-
cancies in Russia appear to have exceeded that level. 
62 See Ellen Barry, Kiosk Crackdown Yields Sidewalk Space, Bitterness, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 
14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file ("'In 1990, new laws made it possible to 
sell goods with your bare hands anywhere except the Kremlin walls ..•.. At first there were only 
60 or 70 kiosks, .•. but then the number rose sharply' to the 16,000 [metal kiosks] that lined Mos-
cow's streets in 1993, [Moscow Mayor] Luzhkov said."). 
63 See Fred Kaplan, Dirty Capitalism, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 1993, at 61 ("The kiosk has 
become a double-edged symbol of Russia's transition from socialism to capitalism - a quick way 
to break into free enterprise and bring merchandise to the market, yet also a shoddy hut of tawdry 
goods and corruption."); Sergei Khrushchev, Stands of Dirty Capitalism, AsIA, INc., Mar. 1994, at 
86, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (describing kiosks as "symbolic of the chaos in 
the Russian economy"); Kathy Lally, Kiosks Provide Muscovites a Ticket VP, BALTIMORE SUN, 
Dec. 13, 1992, at 3A ("Russians look at the kiosks, which sell everything from liquor and fur coats 
to shampoo and underwear, and see either certain economic ruin or guaranteed salvation.,,); Adam 
Tanner, City to Cut Kiosks, Urges Move to Stores, Moscow TIMES, July 17, 1994, at 32 (noting 
that kiosks "have come to symbolize the early stage of capitalism in Moscow"). 
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and analytic indicator for measuring a transition country's progress 
from anticommons to private property.64 In Poland, for example, anti-
commons property in commercial real estate lasted less than a year: ki-
osks appeared briefly, but viable private property rights in commercial 
storefronts soon emerged.65 By contrast, in Russia, kiosks remain an 
important presence on the streets.66 Why have Moscow merchants not 
completed the move from kiosks into stores?67 The answer lies partly in 
the legal regime surrounding commercial real estate.68 One newspaper 
article reports: "All this buying and selling takes place on the street be-
cause the title to most stores is unclear or because stores are occupied by 
moribund state enterprises. The sidewalks were free and empty, so the 
64 See Anne Barnard, Luzhkov Steps Up War on Kiosks, Moscow TIMES, May 5, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file (quoting Moscow Mayor Luzhkov to say that kiosks 
"have fulfilled their purpose .... Now it is time for trade to go back into the stores. ") 
65 See id. ("[K]iosks sprouted in Warsaw for about a year as the free market gained a foothold, 
and then 'naturally disappeared' without pressure from city authorities as merchants moved into 
shops."); Grzegorz Wojtowicz, World Bank Assignment: Poles' Retail Privatization OlltstripS Re-
gion's, WARSAW VOICE, Apr. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file. However, 
even in Poland, problems of anticommons bundling have not been entirely overcome in theory. 
Rapaczynski notes: 
[T]he western rim countries in transition - such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Re-
public - have by and large created a legal basis for private ownership of land of all kinds. 
Although this fact has certainly contributed to the fast growth of the new private sector, the 
rights actually acquired by most users of commercial premises have been significantly less 
complete and more insecure than those made possible by the legal sYstem. 
Rapaczynski, supra note 13, at 98. See generally EARLE, FRYDMAN, RAPACZYNSKl & 
TuRKEWITZ, supra note 58, at 175-237 (describing Poland's privatization process). 
66 However, some evidence suggests that kiosk numbers may now be decreasing. See infra pp. 
645-47 (discussing conflicting evidence on the Moscow kiosk popUlation). 
67 In addition to the legal regime, a range of practical business reasons suggest why merchants 
could prefer to start with kiosks rather than stores. First, merchants report that they can accumu-
late the capital to stock a small kiosk more readily than the relatively large interiors of typical Rus-
sian stores. See Tanner, supra note 63 ("Tvetkov, like many businesspeople, still finds the prospect 
of opening a store overly daunting .... Among the obstacles he cited was the high cost of inventory. 
His kiosk stocks about 1.5 million to 2 million rubles worth of goods, far below what a store would 
require."). This concern might not be determinative if commercial space were divisible among 
merchants and leases secure and marketable. Second, merchants may be better able to respond to 
market demands by changing kiosk location. However, kiosks are often located in prominent pe-
destrian areas in front of empty stores. Third, merchants may be more vulnerable to regulatory 
holdups in a fixed commercial location than in a movable kiosk. See id. ("Other would-be store-
owners cite Moscow's hesitation to privatize its commercial space, bureaucracy, crime, and corrupt 
government officials as barriers to retail expansion."). But city regulators and mafia gangs are 
equally adept at tapping kiosks and stores as a source of informal revenue. Fourth, merchants pre-
fer kiosks because store rents are high. However, this reasoning is backward. Store rents are high 
because space is scarce. If store leases were more readily available, prices would drop from current 
levels. There is pervasive excess demand for stores, but they may not be available at any price in 
an anticommons. 
68 See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, Moscow Journal: It's a Kiosk! It's a Mall! No, It's Slavyansky 
Ryad!, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at A4 ("So far, it is still a sidewalk empire, given the continued 
difficulties of getting adequate store space. 'Until now, it was simply not worth spending a year 
and [a] half fighting the bureaucracy to get space on a first floor,' [said a kiosk owner]. "). 
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new entrepreneurs moved in."69 Leasing of stores,7o conversion of in-
dustrialland to commercial use,71 new commercial real estate develop-
ment,72 and other alternatives to privatization of existing stores all 
stalled during the first years of transition. 
2. The Moscow Storefront in a Legal Context. - Within the legal 
and institutional context of the Moscow storefront, the main actors are 
a wide variety of state and quasi-state organizations.73 During the early 
stage of transition in I990, formal ownership of real estate was decen-
tralized from federal to regional (oblast) and local governments.74 In a 
monograph on commercial real estate markets in Russia, April Harding 
notes that a major source of the ambiguity of local government owner-
ship can be explained by "conflicting efforts on the part of the federal 
government to strengthen general ownership and property rights, while 
it is also trying to constrain the property rights of local governments."75 
The initial assignments of state property to different levels of gov-
ernment were opaque and varied.76 Through a complex set of federal 
decentralization laws and decrees, local and regional government agen-
cies emerged as the key players, with nearly monopolistic control over 
property such as commercial real estate.77 The initial decentralization 
69 Lally, supra note 63. 
70 See Frenkel, supra note 24, at 296-300. 
71 The paralysis in Russia's commercial real estate markets is also analogous to reforms of Rus-
sian enterprises, which privatized rapidly but which have moved slowly in restructuring assets to-
ward more productive uses. The partial success of enterprise privatization can be explained be-
cause decentralization and privatization have plausibly created an anticommons at the plant level. 
See section IV,A (discussing enterprise privatization); see also MAxIM BOYCKO, ANDREI 
SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIvATIZING RUSSIA 69-95 (I995) (detailing the process of enter-
prise privatization). 
72 See STEPHEN B. BUTLER, THE LEGAL BASIS FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING IN 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION I-4 (I993); Andrei A. Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Re-
fonns and Impediments, I7 Loy. L.A.lNT'L & COMPo L.J. I, 23-26 (I994); Frenkel, supra note 24, 
at 286-g6. 
73 This discussion of the players and their roles in the commercial real estate market in Russia 
is drawn primarily from a paper by HARDING, cited above in note 46, at 6-I4 and I8-I9, and from 
my work in Moscow for the World Bank on transition countries during I99I-94. See generally 
HeUer & Harding, supra note 22, at I-3 (suggesting methods to eliminate "barriers to commercial 
real estate markets"}. 
74 See Nadezhda B. Kosareva, Alexander S. puzanov & Maria V. Tikhomirova, Russia: Fast 
Starter - Housing Sector Reform 1991-1995, in ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE FORMER 
SOVIET BLOC, supra note 5I, at 255, 256 ("Housing reform in Russia started at the end of I990 
with the law 'On Local Self-Government in RSFSR '''}. 
75 HARDING, supra note 46, at 8. According to Harding: 
This struggle to seize control over real estate assets is a key front in the much wider power 
struggle between central and local governments .... This lack of transparency, combined 
with the weakness of the lessees means that there is little pressure on the regulatory agen-
cies to cooperate in freeing up space, or to refrain from intervening in activities after the 
lease is signed. 
!d. at8-g. 
76 See id. at 6-7. 
77 See id. at 7. Harding summarizes five types of administrative bodies that operate on the 
property stage. 
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process led to numerous competing claims among local, regional, and 
federal authorities.78 Harding notes that, within this organizational 
setup, four categories of rights-holders emerged during the transition. 79 
Each of these categories of rights-holders are "owners" in the sense that 
they could block other rights-holders from using a store without permis-
sion. 
(a) Owners. - Owners begin transition with limited and ambiguous 
rights. Although the local government council (duma) is the formal 
owner of much commercial real estate and is empowered to sell, lease, 
or mortgage assets, it holds weaker rights than those usually associated 
with ownership in market economies. The federal government retains 
some control, such as the rights to specify a sale or lease process and to 
defme the range of possible prices.80 
(b) Users. - Users or occupants of commercial property, often 
workers' collectives of the state enterprise assigned to the space, also 
First, the federal government retained regulatory rights, exercising those rights mostly through 
the Federal Committee Jor Management oj State Property (known by its Russian initials, GKI). 
Although the GKI exercises federal rights as to the privatization and management of buildings and 
is responsible for promulgating property rights legislation in general, another federal agency, the 
State Land Committee, exercises control over the land rights and legislation. See id. 
Second, local and oblast Property Committees, which are formally subordinate both to the fed-
eral GKI and to local administration, playa large role in property management, allocation, rent-
setting, and maintenance. See id. 
Third, oblast-level CommitteesJor the Preservation oj Architectural and Historical Monuments 
play an important role in the allocation and management of any building on their registers, which 
has included almost every building in city centers and many outside the commercial core, regard-
less of historical distinction. See id. "While the formal rights of this agency are not clear, in prac-
tice, it is often effective in preventing any sales of real estate. It frequently influences the allocation 
process, and participates in the rental revenue streams either on a formal or informal basis." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
Fourth, local Housing Maintenance Organizations do not hold any management power, but 
must give consent to lease or seH any of the assets they maintain. They are frequently able to i1'Jflu-
ence allocation of space and coHection of rents because of their day-to-day proximity to the build-
ings they maintain. See id. 
Fifth, and similarly, local Bureaus oj Technical Inventory have "no formal authority over 
building management or allocation." Id. at 8. However, their monopoly role as keeper of the 
physical and technical specifications of buildings "gives them leverage in any transfers or registra-
tions." Id. 
78 For example, Harding highlights the situation in which "[a] building listed on the balance-
sheet of a privatizing enterprise may have restaurant facilities (which should go to municipal 
authorities) and a medical clinic (which should go to oblast officials) - to whom should the build-
ing be handed?" I d. at 7. 
This Article focuses on the situation in which multiple owners are given rights in one familiar 
object of property, such as an apartment, restaurant, or clinic, rather than conflicts over the whole 
building. Divided ownership of buildings is a standard Western property rights arrangement, ei-
ther through condominium or cooperative form. This distinction between divided rights in a single 
apartment and divided rights in a building reflects an implicit understanding about what consti-
tutes the scale of the "normal" use of property. For a discussion of this point, see below p. 652 and 
notes 154 and 228. 
79 This framework and the foHowing descriptions are drawn from HARDING, cited above in 
note 46, at 8-9. 
80 Seeid. at 8. 
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have ambiguous rights, derived in part from the strong occupancy 
rights under seventy years of socialist law. Local property committees 
are trying to convert squatter-type rights of current occupants into more 
formal lease arrangements.81 
(c) Balance-Sheet Holders. - "Balance-sheet holders" represent an 
archaic Soviet form of property ownership that is analogous to a trust 
relationship in the West. The balance-sheet holder was a subordinate 
state organization or individual who had rights to use and dispose of 
property formally owned "by the people" as state property. The conver-
sion of balance-sheet holders' rights into a form of rights compatible 
with marketability has been uneven. Depending on the strength of the 
particular balance-sheet holder, it may now have no rights or may be 
included as a co-lessor, subordinate to the owner of leased property.82 
(d) Regulators. - Six agencies must approve all leases, including 
the city architect, the Committee on Preservation of Architecture and 
Historical Monuments, and the land-reform committee.83 This overlap 
in the regulatory function of these agencies does not differ substantially 
from standard Western models; however, the regulators are included 
here because the rights they exercise are often decisive in blocking mar-
ket use of property. Local agencies often find themselves using their 
rights as if they were owners because they lack indirect mechanisms of 
governmental control over real estate, such as zoning boards and prop-
erty taxes.84 
3. Emergence of the Anticommons. - During the process of privati-
zation, the new legal regime in Russia ratified some existing socialist 
and informal use rights while it superimposed a new set of market own-
ership rights.85 For example, the socialist distinction between owner-
ship of land and of structures has carried over.86 As a result, in post-
socialist Russia, a heterogeneous set of owners have been thrown to-
gether in any given store (Figure 2).87 Some of the owners, such as state 
enterprises, research institutes, and maintenance organizations, may be 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 8-9; Note, Russian Property Law, Privatization, and the Right oj "Full Economic 
Control", 107 HARV. L. REv. 1044, 1052-54 (1994). 
83 See HARDING, supra note 46, at 9. 
84 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 60. 
85 See, e.g., Dominic Gualtieri, Russia's New 'War oj Laws,' RADIO FREE EUROPEIRADIO 
LIBERTY REs. REp., Sept. 3, 1993, at 10, II. 
86 According to one commentator: 
Private ownership of immovable (real) propert;y other than land is far less controversial po-
litically and is much more firmly settled in Russian law, although, the practice of transfer-
ring rights .•. in buildings, houses, installations and other commercial properties also tends 
to be plagued by the very same bureaucratic problems of local authorities unwilling to effect 
registration or perform some other ministerial tasks necessary for a valid transfer of owner-
ship or lease rights. 
Frenkel, supra note 24, at 266. 
87 See HARDING, supra note 46, at 12. Figure 2 collates the actors discussed above in note 77 
with the categories of ownership discussed in the text above. 
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private or quasi-private; the others are local, regional, and federal gov-
ernmental bodies. 
PROPERTY RIGHT OWNER 
Right to sell Local administration 
Property committee 
Committee for Architecture and Historical 
Preservation 




Right to receive Federal government 
sale revenue Oblast administration 
Local administration 
Property committee 
Committee for Architecture and Historical 
Preservation 
Right to lease Property committee 
State enterprise or institute 
Maintenance organization 
Right to receive Relevant administration 
lease revenue88 Property committee 
Committee for Architecture and Historical 
Preservation 
State enterprise or institute 
Maintenance organization 
Right to determine use89 Planning committee 
Property committee 
Balance-sheet holder 
Right to occupy Workers' collective 
FIGURE 2. Owners of Storefront Rights 
88 This right is locally determined. The most frequent recipients are listed. 
89 The "right to determine use" exists apart from similar rights ordinarily held by local zoning 
regulators in Russia and market economies: 
The legal documents [for a retail store] may require that the area be used for a specific area 
of retail activity, often stipulating that a space must be used for its previous function - for 
example, as a bread store or housewares shop. The landlord of the site must make addi-
tional payments to relevant authorities if the retail tenant wishes to change the use of a 
store. The process takes time, and the landlord cannot guarantee that tenants are automati-
cally granted a change of use upon signing lease or purchase documents. 
Anna Fomin, Retailers, Look Before You Lease, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, News library, Curnws file. 
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Figure 2 suggests further complexities for transition in Moscow 
storefronts. First, multiple parties may share most rights. In this exam-
ple, such multiple owners must agree among themselves to exercise 
their "ownership" stick in the property bundle.90 Second, local govern-
ment agencies may be distinguished from the bureaucrats who occupy 
decisionmaking roles and control use of the property.91 Because the dif-
ference between municipally-set rents and market rents is significant, 
the exercise of lease rights can become a source of revenue for local offi-
cials in their private capacity.92 Put more colloquially, officials may ex-
change leases at below-market rents for bribes. 
Because multiple parties may hold the same right, almost any use of 
the storefront requires the agreement of mUltiple parties.93 Even if only 
one party opposes the use, that party may be able to block others from 
exercising their rights.94 The Moscow storefront thus meets my defini-
tion of anticommons property, that is, a property regime in which mul-
tiple owners hold rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy 
of the storefront anticommons is that owners waste the resource when 
they fail to agree on a use. Empty stores result in forgone economic op-
portunity and lost jobs. As of 1995, about 95% of commercial real es-
tate in Russia remained in some form of divided local government own-
ership.95 Of this commercial real estate, a significant portion was 
90 See HARDING, supra note 46, at 12-13. 
91 Andrei Shleifer applies the terms "legal" and "physical" control rights to describe this distinc-
tion. See Shleifer, supra note 3, at 95; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs 
and Benefits oj Ownership: A Theory oj Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694 
(1986) (defining property rights in terms of control rights over assets). 
92 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 60. 
93 As Frenkel notes: 
[A variety of leasing arrangements] are often used when the lessor does not have legal ca-
pacity to grant any lease or even sublease interests in a land parcel. Often the lessor has 
subleased the rights from the city or holds land use rights, but has not obtained any right to 
sublease to third parties. Often, the Russian lessor is a governmental or a state-owned en-
tity without clear ownership or even possession rights to the premises it currently occupies. 
Frenkel, supra note 24, at 297-98. 
94 Owners exercise their rights to block use in a variety of ways, from formal measures such as 
requesting court intervention, to informal or self-help measures that characterize the Russian retail 
scene. See STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S NEW MAFIYA 59-72 (1995); 
Vladimir Shlapentokh, Russia: Privatization and Illegalization oj Social and Political Life, WASH. 
Q., Winter 1996, at 65,76-77. From the perspective of an entrepreneur looking to set up a shop, 
even the threat of informal measures from competing claimants to the storefront may be enough to 
deter long-term investment. 
95 Continued local government ownership of stores suggests an alternative explanation for why 
stores remain empty. Local governments may not behave like private profit-maximizing actors in 
managing their real estate portfolio. This public-private distinction may help explain some store-
front vacancies. However, the fact of public ownership does not help explain the difference be-
tween the poor performance of storefronts and the vibrancy of kiosk markets. First, both are pub-
licly owned spaces. Second, local governments in some countries in transition, such as Poland, 
were able to market credible leases quickly. See EARLE, FRYDMAN, RAPACZYNSKI & 
TuRKEWITZ, supra note 58, at 181-83. Third, local governments in transition countries do have 
incentives to act as profit-maximizers. They are desperate for revenue because they have signifi-
cant social-welfare responsibilities and little by way of independent fiscal capacity or intergovern-
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unused.96 
4. Overcoming the Anticommons. - Moving a storefront from anti-
commons to private property ownership requires unifying fragmented 
property rights into a usable bundle. In other words, creating private 
property requires moving from too many owners, each exercising a 
right of exclusion, to a sole decisionmaker, controlling a bundle of 
rights. To have private property in a storefront, a sole owner must in 
principle be able to sell or lease the property, receive the revenue from 
the sale or lease, occupy the premises, and determine how a lessee may 
use the property.97 
After transition governments accidentally create anticommons prop-
erty by ratifying pre-existing socialist rights, owners face two main ex 
post routes by which their rights can be assembled into usable bundles: 
through markets or through governments. In markets, entrepreneurial 
property bundlers may assemble control over stores by negotiating with 
all the holders of rights of exclusion. Over time, store by store, individ-
ual market transactions can convert an anticommons. Indeed, some 
evidence suggests that this process may be happening already in Rus-
sia.98 Alternatively, the market route to bundling rights might fail alto-
gether if the transaction costs of bundling exceed the gains from conver-
sion, or if owners engage in strategic behavior such as holding out for 
the conversion premium. 
The market route to bundling may be further subdivided into two 
types: legal and illegal market transactions. In a legal transaction, a 
property bundler would buy each right from its holder through formal, 
enforceable contracts. In the storefront example, because of the diver-
gent incentives between public agency owners and their bureaucratic 
mental transfers. Store leases could make up an important source of revenue. Finally, apart from 
the fiscal pressures on local governments, storefronts represent a significant potential sour!:e of il-
licit wealth for local government officials. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 
60. If these officials have proven their ability to create illegal markets in space for street kiosks, 
why not for storefronts? 
96 See supra note 61. . 
97 Cj. Michelman, supra note 9, at 5 (identifying principles of initial acquisition and reassign-
ment fundamental to a private property regime). After a sole owner collects a standard bundle of 
rights, she may subsequently decide to break up her bundle along spatial or temporal dimensions, 
such as by selling a portion of the space or leasing it for a period of time. Part IT discusses how 
market economies prevent excessive fragmentation by a private owner through hierarchical con-
trols that establish priority and resolve conflicts among competing rights-holders. These rules for 
priority are missing in anticommons relations and are a locus of conflict in Moscow storefronts. 
98 See Tatyana Leiye, Where~ the Rent Going?, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file. As Leiye discovered: 
[d. 
A look at nine buildings on Tverskaya Ulitsa fa prime downtown Moscow street] found 
4,100 square meters of commercial space that was either empty or was illegally occupied by 
firms with forged documents. These firms, instead of contributing to the city budget, are ei-
ther paying someone off on the side or paying nothing at all. ... The figure of 4,100 square 
meters refers to just nine Moscow buildings. What would we find if we surveyed the entire 
city? Or the entire country? 
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agents, negotiations may only be possible through informal or corrupt 
channels.99 Over time, these corrupt channels can be routinized and 
may replace legal transactions. However, routinized corruption imposes 
its own, hard-to-measure costs on economic efficiency, particularly in 
terms of forgone long-term investments. loo 
The alternative route to bundling is for government to intervene by 
redefining and reallocating property rights. The national government 
could abolish rights previously granted, eliminate subordinate levels or 
agencies of government, or expropriate or condemn existing rights. Lo-
cal governments could exert more control over their subordinate agen-
cies and transfer rights to, or consolidate rights in, the equivalent of a 
"sole owner," a single public decisionmaker able to act as an owner on 
behalf of the local government. However, existing rights-holders, in-
cluding local government agencies and the private actors who have in-
vested in reliance on the current property regime, may cling tenaciously 
to their rights. Many now have plausible claims that their rights have 
vested, and redefming rights to bundle them more sensibly would 
amount to a compensable taking of their property.lOl 
Were the government to revoke or confiscate existing rights without 
compensation, current and potential investors in Russia might be even 
more discouraged from entering the market. l02 Because of their pre-
carious fiscal condition, neither the national government nor local gov-
ernments in Russia are likely to pursue the alternative route of redefin-
ing the rights more sensibly and paying compensation to those whose 
rights are taken.103 More generally, transition governments may be 
[d. 
99 See id. Leiye writes: 
According to current legislation, there are two ways to obtain a lease on commercial prop-
ert;y in Moscow. Either one can participate in competitive bidding or one can pass along a 
complex bureaucratic chain, gathering numerous signatures and approval forms .... Need-
less-to say, there are always those who don't want to go through all this red tape and who 
therefore try to find some way around that is faster and cheaper. So, naturally, a third vari-
ant has developed - going straight to the director of a certain propert;y and striking a direct 
deal to lease a portion of it That is why ... so far not a single desirable propert;y in the cen-
ter of the city has come up for competitive bidding. 
100 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 106-07 
(1978); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 95-96; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
VlShny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 615 (1993). 
101 The formal right to compensation for expropriation of private propert;y is now established in 
Russian law, though the practice is undeveloped. See, e.g., Law of the Russian Federation on Basic 
Principles of the Federal Housing Policy, supra note 24. The issue of compensation for intergov-
ernmental takings is more complex and less documented. It is bound up in the larger struggle in 
Russia between central and local governments. See supra pp. 635-37. 
102 See Michelman, supra note 14, at 1214-18 (elaborating the calculus of settlement and demor-
alization costs for use in deciding whether a government should compensate for a regulatory 
change). 
103 Compulsory unitization of anticommons rights could provide governments with an alterna-
tive method of assembling private property bundles that may avoid the compensation-
demoralization trap. Under United States law, unitization is the process by which all of the rights-
holders in an asset (such as landowners located over an oil field) are formed into a single unit, 
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 642 1997-1998
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. III:621 
forced to choose either to defend badly designed property rights and to 
wait for the market to sort out the problems, or to intervene in the mar-
ket and to undermine investor confidence. 
C. Moving Along the Gradient: Kiosks, Apartments, Komunalkas 
Storefronts represent only one point along a gradient of socialist 
property in transition. Experience at other points along this gradient 
suggests possible paths into and out of the tragedy of the anticommons. 
This section first moves outside to examine street kiosks. Then, the sec-
tion moves upstairs to study residential real estate: individual apart-
ments and komunalkas. 
I. Street Kiosks. 
(a) Appearance of the Kiosks. - What explains the persistence of 
the anticommons in stores, in contrast to the resolution of the antic om-
mons on the streets? During the early years of transition, kiosk mer-
chants were also faced with an anticommons: a property regime in 
which numerous parties, holding both formal and informal rights, could 
block street access. 104 However, by the early I990S, merchants could 
acquire informal rights on the streets to set up commercial outlets. lOS 
Kiosk merchants negotiated around the anticommons regime through 
which then operates the asset as if it were held by a single owner. Proceeds from the unit are dis-
tributed to the owners according to a preset formula. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 750-55 
(A. James Carter ed., 1952 & 1977 Supp.); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KruER, PROPERTY 54-55 
(Jd ed. 1993). 
An analogous process of "land pooling and readjustment" has operated in Germany, Australia, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. See WORLD BANK, supra note 49, at 132 C'1\vo of the main require-
ments for success are consensus among landlords and trust in the implementing organization." 
(citing Yasuo Nishiyama, Western Influence on Urban Planning Administration in Japan: Foclls 
on Land Management, in URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES: Focus ON LAND 
MANAGEMENT 315, 327-52 (Haruo Nagamine ed., 1986»). Similarly, in Russia, governments 
could establish a process by which mUltiple owners of a storefront could trade their rights for a 
percentage share in a unit that leased or sold the asset. However, compulsorY unitization in Russia 
would run into familiar problems of valuation and administrative incapacity. 
104 The government had always tried to block kiosk street access, but kiosks persisted: 
[O]n one hand, Moscow has always been filled with kiosks and, on the other, ..• the gov-
ernment has always been trying to get rid of them. Even before Moscow had real books or 
verY many people who could read them, there were wooden kiosks throughout the city ••.• 
In the days of Ivan the Terrible, you could stop by a neighborhood kiosk for a refreshing 
cup of kvas. And back when the Kremlin was still made of wood, the government - even 
though it did not have those special kiosk-removal trucks - had to order the kiosks cleared 
from Red Square because of the danger of fires .... Even Stalin could not get rid of them 
entirely. 
Kiosks Are As Russian As Borshch, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News 
librarY, Arcnws file. 
105 As one article notes: 
Kiosks trace their roots to Soyuzpechat, the government agency responsible for newpaper 
and magazine sales in the former Soviet Union. But around 1990, these glass booths began 
attracting fledgling entrepreneurs. Publications gradually gave way to items such as ciga-
rettes, liquor, food, and toiletries. At kiosks, which now resemble small metal fortresses, 
consumers can buy anything. 
Khrushchev, supra note 63, at 86. 
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ex post contracting: they executed corruption contracts with local gov-
ernment rights-holders and protection contracts with the mafia. l06 By 
contrast, storefronts continue to remain relatively empty, despite entre-
preneurs' willingness either to follow formal procedures, or to bribe city 
officials and to pay protection money to criminal organizations in order 
to get access to the space. 107 
Kiosks provided an early solution to the problem of establishing 
commercial outlets in a country desperately short of retail services. lOS 
Indeed, the market for kiosks and storefront real estate are linked. The 
success of kiosks may have reduced pressure to overcome the antic om-
mons in stores. On the streets, no complex web of rights needed to be 
bundled. Instead, kiosk merchants had to bribe only a limited number 
of municipal officials and an easily identifiable criminal organization. l09 
By routinizing the corruption process, entrepreneurs quickly reduced 
the transaction costs of assembling quasi-private bundles of rights in 
kiosk locations: 
[R]egular payments must be made to local officials and a powerful mafia 
. . .. "You have to pay bribes to get financing," [Karlamov, a kiosk owner,] 
said. "You have to pay bribes to get permission to put your kiosk up on a 
promising site. And even after things are all set up, you have to pay bribes 
to make sure they don't close you down. The mafia is the easiest of all to 
deal with. They don't charge too much, they tell you exactly what they 
want up front, and when an agreement is made, they live up to it. They 
don't come back asking for more .... The hardest part was finding out who 
was the right person to bribe," he explained. "At first, we had no idea who 
could do what, so we began visiting the local prefect's office almost every 
106 As one article notes: 
[Andrei, a kiosk owner,] has had to bribe tax inspectors, pay protection money to mafia 
toughs and fork over 'gifts' to officials whose approval is needed for a business license .... 
. To start his business Andrei needed to get a host of city officials - firefighters, electricians, 
architects - to sign his permit request ... When a date was set for delivery of the kiosk, 
Anlirei and his partner took care of a key business matter: making peace with the 'protec-
tion' racketeers who have carved Moscow up into fiefdoms and who punish those who re-
sist 
Margaret Shapiro, Perils of Kiosk Capitalism: Russia's New Entrepreneurs Pay for Permits and 
Protection, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1993, at AIS. 
107 See supra note 67 (examining reasons that businesspeople may prefer kiosks to stores in the 
early stages of transition). 
108 See Barnard, supra note 64 C'Stuffed with everything from canned peas to kiwi liqueur to fur 
coats, kiosks have blossomed as the first alternative to nearly empty Soviet-era stores. "). 
109 See Khrushchev, supra note 63, at 86. Khrushchev writes: 
Id. 
[G]etting started is a bureaucratic nightmare and often requires millions of rubles in bribes. 
But entrepreneurs can get the necessary permits for about $100, not from government li-
censing authorities but from non-official businessmen such as owners of nearby stores .... 
[M]ost of the illegal kiosks are protected by groups (read mafia) ... [that] lease extensive 
parts of the city for a 'nominal price' (gigantic bribes) and then divide them into tiny 
squares that are rented out The group is czar and god over its territory. It protects the 
traders and solves any problems they have with local officials and other gangsters. It even 
handles taxes. 
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day. We gave candy and other presents to people we met there, and eventu-
ally they directed us to people who could help."110 
Creation of commercial space through corruption and protection con-
tracts can be reasonably stable over time when procedures become rou-
tinized and entrepreneurs come to rely on formal forbearance and in-
formal ex post assembly of anticommons rights into private property 
rights. 
However, the kiosk system does not generate the levels of economic 
activity that could be achieved by a well-functioning retail sector. Her-
nando de Soto, a leading theorist on the connection between law and 
economic development, discusses this issue indirectly.1l1 Noting the 
prevalence of the informal economy in developing countries, he makes 
two points. First, he argues that the vibrant informal economy should 
be viewed as an important contribution to the overall economic per-
formance, rather than a drain. ll2 Second, and just as importantly, he 
contends that commentators should not mistake vibrancy for optimal-
ity, either along efficiency or distributive dimensions. ll3 People are in 
the informal economy because the formal legal system drives them 
there. Informal merchants could contribute much more to the economy 
if the legal system made it possible for them to work in the formal sec-
tor.1l4 For de Soto, "third world under-development" arises from the 
combination of badly specified formal property rights and their ex post 
rearrangement through illegal contracts.ll5 The informal economy rep-
lIO James P. Gallagher, Russia's Kiosk Capitalists Keep Wary Eye on Hard-Line Premier, Cm. 
TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at I; see also Frank Brown, Life in a Metal-and-Plexiglass Box, MoscoW 
TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file {"Although [one kiosk owner] 
complained about racketeers, bribes and stealing, she said the monthly fee paid to the mafia 'is 
worth it. "'}. In the words of another reporter: 
Most kiosks don't pay taxes. The state, of course, requires tribute but has no practical way 
of collecting. Tax inspectors can't verify kiosks' earnings and therefore don't know how 
much to collect. [Mafia] routinely help their kiosks hide earnings and inform them when 
tax inspectors are about to show up. The [mafia] groups have become increasingly impor-
tant to kiosk owners. Unlike government officials, they act like industrious owners. For 
example, while the state imposes a 50 percent or more tax on profits, [mafia] are satisfied 
with a 5 percent to 10 percent cut. [Mafia] also protect traders from rival gangsters. 
Khrushchev, supra note 63, at 86. 
lIi See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INvISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD 177-82 (1989). 
112 See id. at 60-6i. 
1I3 See id. at 151-72. 
1I4 See id. at 72,152,173-77. 
lIS See id. De Soto argues that the potential efficiency of informal systems is bounded by the 
need to hide from or bribe the public sector: 
Having established that there are costs to being illegal, we asked ourselves whether elimi-
nating those costs would be enough to transform informality into the best of all possible 
worlds. [We are convinced that this would not be] true and that informals suffer not only 
from their illegality but also from the absence of a legal system that guarantees and pro-
motes their economic efficiency - in other words, of good law. 
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resents a second-best solution, the triumph of ingenuity in the face of 
bad law. De Soto argues that a better solution would be to create the 
"good law" that characterizes successful economies, such as property 
registries, patent protection, and provisions for inexpensive enforce-
ment of long-term contracts. U6 
The proliferation of kiosks in Russia suggests that one path to over-
coming a tragedy of the anticommons may be by tolerating informal 
corruption contracts. However, de Soto's work suggests that the re-
sulting quasi-private property rights will likely operate at a lower level 
of economic efficiency than will well-bundled formal property rights, in 
part because the incentives for long-t~rm investment are blunted. 
(b) Disappearance of the Kiosks. - Recently, the Moscow city gov-
ernment has tried to eliminate kiosks from the streets, with mixed re-
sults.1l7 The apparent reduction in the number of kiosks from 1994 to 
1996 could be interpreted in two ways that relate to the storefront anti-
commons. The first interpretation is that the government has success-
fully specified a better set of property rights in retail storefront space, 
and that market actors have relied on those rights to shift away from 
kiosks. As storefronts become more available, rents might drop, and 
merchants might decide to replace kiosks with storefronts. us Under 
this interpretation, the gradual decrease in kiosks reflects the gradual 
resolution of the storefront anticommons. U9 
I d. at 158. Developing "good law" on which people may rely - for example, mechanisms to secure 
credit or protect intellectual property - allows much higher levels of economic performance. I 
would place bundling property rights coherently at the same level as de Soto's examples. 
116 See id. at 161-62 (property registries), 164-71 (long-term contracts), 177 (patents). 
117 See supra notes 62, 64, 104 (discussing crackdowns on kiosks). 
118 As one reporter has stated: 
[T]hese once ubiquitous symbols of Russia's free-market transformation are on their way 
out, no longer needed by a country that has clearly moved up a rung on the economic devel-
opment ladder. 
Former state-owned stores, now in private hands, are well stocked, lines have disap-
peared, and salespeople, astonishingly, have learned to be more polite .... 
In Moscow, where kiosks began, officials have declared an end to the era of the "box," as 
its occupants call them. The government has begun slowly clearing them away, calling 
them crime traps and eyesores. Last year there were 17,000 kiosks in Moscow; today there 
are 10,000 • • •• By next year, .•. most of them should be gone. 
"We believe that kiosks have fulfilled their role," [a city official said.] "It was natural that 
kiosks developed when they did[. "] ... 
Dusty old state-owned stores that officially had been privatized in 1992 but continued to 
operate as inefficiently as before have finally started to recognize the bottom line and adapt. 
Margaret Shapiro, Kiosks, Once Symbol oj Free Market, Giving Way to Capitalism's Success: Mos-
cow Stores' Service, Variety Rendering Sidewalk Stands Obsolete, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1995, at 
A33· 
119 From sketchy accounts, this interpretation does seem to describe the kiosk to storefront tra-
jectory in Poland. In Poland, the small-scale privatization program quickly eliminated most com-
peting owners from legal or practical control over commercial space and assembled tradable pri-
vate property bundles for retail space. See Barnard, supra note 64 (reporting that kiosks "sprouted 
in Warsaw for about a year as the free market gained a foothold, and then 'naturally disappeared' 
without pressure from city authorities as merchants moved into shops"). 
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Alternatively, and more plausibly, the apparent decline in the num-
ber of kiosks is not linked to resolution of the storefront antic om-
mons.120 Instead, with the use of sufficient force, the city could enforce 
existing laws against kiosks and effectively repudiate the corruption 
bargains that kiosk owners have made with government officials.121 In 
property theory terms, the local government could convert anticom-
mons property in sidewalks into "state property" used by pedestrians.122 
Under this interpretation, the disappearance of kiosks worsens the local 
retail economy and creates even higher repressed demand for retail 
space.123 Indeed, if the storefront anticommons persists, the recent 
crackdowns will likely fail: 
Economists have said that ideally, kiosks should have died out of their own 
accord, as owners move into more stable premises. In Moscow, they said, 
that isn't taking place. "There is the huge challenge of business premises, 
which are so horrendously expensive," said Semyon Bekker, head of the 
city's Department for the Development of Small Business. "In some sense 
kiosks should regulate themselves, since stores will eventually take their 
place. That hasn't happened yet."124 
In de Soto's terms, the persistence of kiosks reflects the continued fail-
ure of the federal and local governments to provide "good law." With-
out good law, the storefront real estate market is not sufficiently elastic 
120 See Ellen Barry, City Bid To Clear Kiosks Falling Short of Targets, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 25, 
1995, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file. Barry writes: 
Id. 
The common kiosk will move one step closer to extinction next week, when Mayor Yury 
Luzhkov's latest clearing order comes due, but statistics from city inspectors show the proc-
ess has hit some snags .... Andrei Sergeyev, who is in charge of cleaning up the western re-
gion of the city, is sweating a little. [Although he] agrees with the mayor's policy, he said its 
pace was straining his resources and shoppers' patience, since new stores had not yet arisen 
to replace kiosks. "This is the type of thing that has to be done gradually, n he said. 
121 See Ellen Barry, Kiosk Issue Explodes in One District, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file e'[O]fficers with machine guns watched as a fork lift 
hoisted one kiosk after another onto a flatbed truck."}. 
122 "State property" can be defined as a property regime in which the following conditions exist: 
[I]n principle, material resources are answerable to the needs and purposes of society as a 
whole, whatever they are and however they are determined, rather than to the needs and 
purposes of particular individuals considered on their own. No individual has such an in-
timate association with any object that he can make decisions about its use without refer-
ence to the interests of the collective. 
Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 328-29 & n.45 
(1985); see also C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND 
CRITICAL POSITIONS I, 5-6 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (offering substantially the same defini-
tion of state property). 
123 See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 63 ("[W]ould-be storeowners cite Moscow's hesitation to privat-
ize its commercial space, bureaucracy, crime, and corrupt government officials as barriers to retail 
expansion .... [A]fter the city removed hundreds of [kiosks], they gradually resurfaced in other 
parts of Moscow."). 
124 Barry, supra note 62. 
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to respond to the continued high demand for retail space, and kiosks 
may simply reappear when repressed.125 
The kiosk example shows how property regimes are connected: the 
resolution of the anticommons on the streets and the persistence of anti-
commons property in stores reinforce each other. Illegal contracts help 
overcome the street anticommons by creating quasi-private property. 
One cost of this path to overcoming anticommons property, however, is 
that governments in transition may create inefficient "third-world" 
market structures. 
2. Individual Apartments. - The creation of private property in 
apartments lies at the opposite end of the protection and performance 
gradient from storefronts.126 Apartments provide a useful counterpoint 
to storefronts, in part because the physical space is often identical. In a 
typical Russian apartment building, the ground floor may be commer-
cial, while the matching units directly above are residential. 127 Thus, 
the difference in performance can be attributed more to the legal regime 
and cultural milieu in which the object is embedded than to intrinsic 
physical distinctions in the space. 
New housing markets have been remarkably successful across the 
former socialist world, not only in terms of raw numbers of units sold, 
but also, more importantly, in the private property relations that have 
been created.128 This is not to say that private property markets in 
125 See Ellen Barry, City Kiosks Outrun the Mayor, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file. Barry writes: 
[d. 
Those wily kiosk owners. After Mayor Yury Luzhkov's latest crackdown limited the num-
ber of kiosks in every subprefectorate, many traders simply installed wheels and took them 
on the road, keeping one step ahead of the city inspectors .... [Nevertheless,] [a]ccording to 
city estimates, the number of kiosks inside the Garden Ring has dwindled from 4,000 to 
1,500 over the last year, and the total number has dropped from 16,000 to about 7,000. 
126 The empirical material in this section is drawn primarily from my work in Russia during 
1991-94 on a team putting together the Russia Housing Project for the World Bank. See WORLD 
BANK, STAFF ApPRAISAL REpORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION HOUSING PROJECT (1995) (unpub-
lished document, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION HOUSING PROJECT]; see also WORLD BANK, RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM AND 
PRIvATIZATION: STRATEGY AND TRANSITION ISSUES (Bertrand Renaud ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM]; Bertrand Renaud, The Housing System o/the Former Soviet Union: 
Why Do the Soviets Need Housing Markets?, 3 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 877, 879-89 (1992) (de-
scribing housing conditions in the former Soviet Union); Struyk, supra note 51, at 255-303 (dis-
cussing housing reform in the former Soviet Union from 1991 to 1995); Raymond ]. Struyk & 
Nadezdha Kosareva, 'fransition in the Russian Housing Sector: 1991-1994, at 16-37 (April 1994) 
(draft working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (discussing legal developments 
concerning housing in the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1994). 
127 See Struyk, supra note 5 I, at 5. 
128 See id. at 46 ("The real estate market has developed rapidly during the period of reforms ...• 
The real estate market which has sprung to life with the easing of restrictions on private ownership 
and market transactions is developing on two fronts: new housing construction and the sale of ex-
isting units."). Although housing is often overlooked as an economic good, it rivals enterprise pri-
vatization in importance. See RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM, supra note 126, at 15-22, 27-34; 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 61-63. 
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housing work as well in post-socialist economies as in Western market 
economies. 129 Many countries are still struggling to create the basic 
framework for private property in housing: real estate taxation systems 
need to be implemented, land registries designed, boundaries drawn, 
ownership disputes resolved, condominium rules established, and the 
entire apparatus of modem regulation of property - zoning, eminent 
domain, and so on - created.130 Despite the lack of this legal and insti-
tutional infrastructure, apartment owners have created vibrant real es-
tate markets, even in remote parts of Russia. 131 
In socialist legal regimes, the standard property bundle for apart-
ments was divided between private and public actors.I32 Mter a local 
government or enterprise assigned an apartment to a family, the family 
owned a lifelong inheritable tenancy.133 This socialist form of property 
included strong tenancy rights and some rights to devise.134 Various 
government departments held the balance of rights, but no one could 
sell or lease the unit at market rates. 13S Generally, residential privatiza-
tion laws offered to the sitting tenant, either for free or for a very low 
price, the ownership and control rights previously held by the state.136 
Rights to sell and receive sale revenue, lease and receive lease revenue, 
occupy, devise, and mortgage were collected by households, with little 
competition from other potential stakeholders such as local govern-
ments or state enterprises. Governments reserved only the regulatory 
rights typical in advanced market economies: rights to zone, eminent 
Privatization of housing may represent the single largest transfer of wealth during the transi-
tion process, despite its decentralized and relatively invisible nature. By comparison, even the 
British "Right to Buy" program, which offered tenants large price discounts, sold only about 20% 
of British social housing units during 1979--82. See Struyk, supra note 51, at 23. As Struyk notes, 
"most countries in the former Soviet bloc have bettered the British record. n I d. 
129 For example, housing in Russia now constitutes only about 20% of national reproducible as-
sets, as compared with 29% in the United States and 43% in France. See RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
HOUSING PROJECT, supra note 126, at 3. As financial and legal reforms deepen, the share of 
housing in national wealth can be expected to increase toward the market economy range. 
130 See STEPHEN B. BUTLER & SHEILA O'LEARY, THE LEGAL BASIS FOR LAND ALLOCATION 
IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 102-30 (1994); RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM, supra note 126, at 82-
90; RUSSIAN FEDERATION HOUSING PROJECT, supra note 126, at 71-80 (providing an annotated 
list of 40 major laws, decrees, and resolutions relating to housing reform and the status of pending 
reforms); id. at 165-76 (identifying regulatory action plans for Russian cities). 
131 See, e.g., Natalya Gamayunova, Wild Apartment Hunt, Moscow TIMES, May 14, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file (noting the existence of 1200 apartment-broker 
firms in Moscow). 
132 See generally Struyk & Kosareva, supra note 126, at 5-9 (describing the ownership rights 
previously associated with Russia's state housing sector). 
133 See RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM, supra note 126, at 149-50; Struyk, supra note 51, at 53. 
134 See Struyk & Kosareva, supra note 126, at 89-90. 
135 See Struyk, supra note 51, at 53. 
136 See id. at 22-28 (describing housing privatization patterns in the former Soviet Bloc); 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 61-63 (providing a summary of housing privati-
zation across transition countries). See generally RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM, supra note 126, at 
15-44 (analyzing privatization of housing in Russia). 
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domain, and so on, with some implied limitations on the scope of gov-
ernment intervention.I37 Combined with pre-existing personal property 
rights, privatization gave tenants control of a property rights bundle in 
apartments that would be recognizable to a Western condominium 
owner.I3S 
One price of achieving these well-functioning bundles is that gov-
ernments have ignored certain distributive goalS. I39 In the apartment 
privatization process, most people were given apartments with negligi-
ble or negative net present economic value because of poor mainte-
nance, high energy costs, or bad locations. I4o The large number on 
waiting lists, particularly young families living in their parents' homes, 
simply lost out.I4I By contrast, a small number of well-connected 
aparatchiks (high officials of the old regime) used their previous posi-
tions to receive high-value, well-maintained apartments in city cen-
ters.I42 During privatization, these aparatchiks, and their elderly 
neighbors who had received units decades earlier, kept the valuable 
apartments. 143 Privatization of housing was not distributively just in 
terms of market values conveyed, but it did discourage aparatchiks 
from blocking reform and it was administratively manageable. Also, 
from a property rights perspective, housing privatization was a coher-
ent process. Unlike storefronts, in which many parties had some rights, 
apartments were conveyed in the form of near-standard market legal 
bundles. 
Not surprisingly, some Western legal academics tried to persuade 
governments to make the tradeoff differently: namely, to achieve more 
distributive justice by dividing the windfalls from privatization more 
equally.I44 For example, Duncan Kennedy, a leading critical legal 
scholar, proposed dividing rights to equity and capital appreciation 
among sitting tenants and local governments.145 These proposals were 
not well received and were not implemented during the early period of 
transition, when there was great enthusiasm for a relatively laissez-faire 
137 See RUSSIA, HOUSING REFORM, supra note 126, at 82-<)0. 
138 As an aside, even where privati2ation programs have been most successful, a laxge percent-
age of tenants in relatively less valuable buildings have chosen to remain as tenants, rather than to 
become owners. See Struyk, supra note 51, at 27. 
139 See id. at 28. 
140 See Struyk & Kosaxeva, supra note 126, at 63-64. 
141 See Struyk, supra note 51, at 28. 
142 See id. 
143 See Struyk, supra note 5 I, at 28. 
144 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Neither the Market nor the State: Housing Privatization Issues, 
in A FOURTH WAY? PRIvATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET 
ECONOMIES 253, 263-64 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994); Duncan Kennedy 
& Leopold Specht, Limited Equity Cooperatives as a Mode of Privatization, in A FOURTH WAY? 
PRIvATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES, supra, at 
267,268. 
145 See Kennedy & Specht, supra note 144, at 268. 
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version of capitalism. 146 Even tenants who were net losers in the priva-
tization process often rejected such proposals because of an apparent 
consensus on what constitutes an ordinary property bundle in a market 
economy.147 Tenants resisted proposals that kept governments involved 
in their lives and that diverged from their understanding of private 
property ownership. 
The apartment example suggests that there may be a tradeoff be-
tween avoiding anticommons tragedy and achieving distributive goals 
in the initial endowment of property rights. When governments trans-
fer coherent bundles of initial endowments in familiar objects, well-
functioning private property markets may emerge even without sup-
porting legal institutions. People can trade standard property bundles 
when they own them. 
3. Communal Apartments. 
(a) The Property Bundler's Equation. - Komunalkas are a subset 
of apartments that have engendered a special loathing across the former 
Soviet Union, where they were prevalent.148 Komunalka performance 
also proves to be a fruitful example to contrast with storefront anti-
commons behavior. Many komunalkas were large prerevolutionary 
apartments, well-situated in downtown apartment buildings. 149 At 
some points in Soviet history, several dozen people might have shared 
146 See Michael A. Heller, Property Rights: A Viewfrom the Trenches, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 203, 
204 (1994); see also Vladimir Loevetsky, What the Russian Public Thinks About Privatization, 
Moscow NEWS, Oct. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file (reporting strong 
support of privatization in a survey of 5000 people). 
147 In one amusing example, my World Bank team and I were called "communists" in a public 
forum held to discuss a proposed loan for housing rehabilitation in Budapest. Our sin was to pro-
pose that some of the profits from the sale of municipally rehabilitated apartments be used to help 
capitaIi2e a fund that would help payoff the rehabilitation loans of elderly and low-income ten-
ants. 
148 In the words of the novelist Mikhail Bulgakov: 
The news of Berlioz' death spread through the building with supernatural speed, and from 
seven o'clock on Thursday morning Bosoi started to get telephone calls. After that people 
began calling in person with written pleas of their urgent need of vacant housing space. 
Within the span of two hours Nikanor Ivanovich had collected thirty-two such statements. 
They contained entreaties, threats, intrigue, denunciations, promises to redecorate the 
apartment, remarks about overcrowding and the impossibility of sharing an apartment with 
hoodlums. Among them was a description, shattering in its literary power, of the theft of 
some meatballs from someone's jacket pocket in apartment No. 31, two threats of suicide 
and one confession of secret pregnancy. 
MIKHAIL BULGAKOV, THE MASTER AND MARGARlTA 92-93 (Michael Glenny trans., Harper & 
Row 1967). Mikhail Zoschenko's short story Nervous People begins: 
Not long ago, a fight took place in our communal apartment. Not just a fight, but an out-
and-out battIe ..•. 
The main reason is - folks are very nervous. They get upset over mere trifles. They get 
all hot and bothered. And because of that they fight crudely, as if they were in a fog. 
Mikhail Zoshchenko, Nervous People, translated in NERVOUS PEOPLE AND OTHER SATIRES 124, 
124 (Maria Gordon & Hugh McLean trans., Hugh McLean ed., 1963). 
149 See Lyudmila Ivanova, You and Me, He and She, Together a Communal Family, 26 
ARGUMENTY 1 FAKTY 6 (1995), translated and condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE 
POST-SOVIET PREss, Aug. 9, 1995, at 10. 
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one komunalka, with each family, comprising up to three generations, 
assigned one room. Kitchen and bathroom facilities were shared. 150 
During privatization, tenants received some ownership rights in their 
room and, indirectly,the right to block others from using the whole 
apartment as a single-family or office space. In other words, each 
owner could keep any other owner from renting out the entire apart-
ment in its most valuable market use. 
This division of rights in the communal apartments helps introduce 
the concept of a spatial anticommons, distinct from the legal anticom-
mons discussed so far. 1S1 In a spatial anticommons, an owner may have 
a relatively standard bundle of rights, but too little space for ordinary 
use. By contrast, in a legal anticommons, substandard bundles of rights 
are allocated to competing owners in a normal amount of space, such as 
a storefront. 
In the case of komunalkas, the apartment qua apartment remains 
empty so long as any room-owner can effectively veto use. If all the 
owners were to sell their rooms and leave the unit, the whole apartment 
could be marketed as a single piece of real estate. Entrepreneurs, often 
in partnership with one of the existing tenants, quickly discovered that 
the well-situated komunalkas could be converted to private property by 
exchanging the owners' rights to rooms for complete apartments on the 
city outskirts.152 To give a numerical example, in the case of some old, 
centrally located komunalkas in Moscow, the market value of the entire 
apartment might approach $500,000.153 Assume such a komunalka had 
150 See id. 
151 See infra sections rv.B, rv.C (describing additional examples of spatial anticommons). 
152 See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, Moscow Privatization Yields Privacy and Problems; Comes the 
Revolution in Apt. 26, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at I; Marcus Warren, Door Shuts on a Russian 
Phenomenon, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jan. 10, 1993, at 14, available in LEXIS, News 
library, Majpap file. 
153 The numbers used in this hypothetical reflect approximate values for good downtown Mos-
cow komunalkas during the last few years. See, e.g., Leiye, supra note 98 ("It is well known that an 
apartment in the center of the city now costs roughly as much as a similar apartment in New 
York."). 
Note that although some komunalkas were well-situated and had high market values, many 
were poorly located or in run-down buildings. In such cases, market pressures may not have oper-
ated to convert these marginal komunalkas to single-family use. As of 1996, 12.5% of Moscow 
families and 22.4% of St. Petersburg families still lived in komunalkas. See Yulia Ulyanova, This 
Is a Communal Country, IzVESTIA, Oct. 26, 1996, at 3, translated and excerpted in 44 CURRENT 
DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PREss, Nov. 27, 1996, at 19. Ulyanova reports that: 
The process of relocating communal apartment dwellers went on at a fairly brisk pace for a 
little over two years ... but then it slowed abruptly. 
Now upscale housing is being built in every major city, and it's no longer necessary to 
agonizingly relocate fussy communal apartment dwellers and then invest enormous 
amounts of money in renovating these Augean stables .... 
[R]eal estate agents have an economic interest only in the "cream of the crop" - those 
communal apartments that can be turned into prestigious or fairly good housing. Most 
communal apartments, even in the two capital Cities, do not meet this criterion. 
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four tenants, each occupying one room. Because of the discomforts and 
irritations of communal living, each of four communal rooms might 
have had a market value of only $25,000 if the rooms were kept in anti-
commons use, so that the whole apartment would have an anticommons 
value of $100,000.154 Converting the komunalka from anticommons to 
private property creates a $400,000 gain that the existing tenants and 
the bundler can divide after paying the transaction costs of conver-
sion. ISS 
Many komunalka owners wanted a place of their own, not just a 
room with a view. Once an apartment was put in play and conversion 
seemed possible, tenants would not sell out for $25,000 each, but would 
typically demand a substitute apartment instead. Adequate substitute 
apartments could be bought on the city outskirts for perhaps $75,000 
each. In this example, by accepting the substitute apartment, each ten-
ant places an implicit $50,000 value on the option giving the property 
bundler the right to convert the komunalka. In sum, removing the four 
room-owners and collecting a usable bundle of rights in the apartment 
might cost an entrepreneur $300,000. In this example, the tenants col-
lectively were able to capture $200,000 of the available economic rent 
through their option value on the right of conversion. IS6 
In addition to paying the implicit option value on conversion, entre-
preneurs incur the transaction costs of bundling anticommons property 
Id.; see also Tatyana Andriasova, Getting Rid of the Neighbors, Moscow NEWS, Feb. 29, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file (reporting that 9% of Moscow residents live in ko-
munalkas). 
154 Of course, some of that potential gain from conversion is re-capitaIized into the value of a 
single room. In a well-functioning market, the value of the room would represent the sum of its 
value as an anticommons space and the expected value from conversion to private property use. 
The strategic moves for tenants and developers are complex: developers may prefer take-it-or-
leave-it offers to the group to avoid holdout problems. Tenants, too, could maximize their individ-
ual values by forming a single bargaining unit among themselves so that developers do not have to 
discount for the transaction costs of bundling. No tenant should sell first, because the last tenant 
can then hold out to extract the gains from conversion. Cooperation with the other tenants may be 
the best strategy for each tenant. 
On the other hand, the best strategy for a developer may be to pick off a single apartment at the 
beginning of conversion in order to block other developers from entering the bidding for the space. 
Once a developer has a foot in the door, she can scare off other bidders and thus pay the remaining 
tenants a below-market price for the whole. If other tenants refuse to selI, the developer can rent 
the room to a particularly noxious neighbor until the holdouts capitulate. The tenant who selIs out 
first may be able to command a lock-up premium from the developer. In this case, defection may 
be the best strategy for each tenant. 
155 Restated, society bears a large deadweight loss if the apartment remains in anticommons 
form, despite the tenants' and bundler's desire to convert it to private property. By definition, a 
deadweight loss occurs whenever the costs of an individual's self-interested act exceed the individ-
ual's benefits from the act. See Robert C. EIIickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326 
(1993)· 
156 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (4th ed. 1992) (defining "eco-
nomic rents,,); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at viii (noting that economic rents 
"can arise through the acquisition of a claim on a resource whose ownership was ambiguous or 
weakly exercised, or through a change in government policy that creates an artificial scarcity"). 
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 653 1997-1998
THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 653 
into private property form. These costs involve finding and negotiating 
with komunalka owners, locating and buying alternative apartments, 
renovating the empty apartment, fmding renters or buyers for the new 
private property unit, policing the deal, and incurring various carrying 
costs and market risks. Assume such transaction costs total $50,000 for 
this deal. Thus, in this simple example, overcoming the anticommons 
might leave a profit for the entrepreneur of $I50,000 ($500,000 in mar-
ket value minus $300,000 in relocation costs and $50,000 in transaction 
costs). Whether the deal takes place is an empirical question that de-
pends on the entrepreneur's ability to keep costs of conversion low and 
to sell the apartment high (Figure 3). 
Private Property Value +500 
1 private apt. @ $SOOK 
Potential Gains from 
Conversion = $400K 
Anticommons Value -100 
4 rooms @ $2SK = $l00K 
Property Bundler 
Option Value of Buys Out and 
Conversion - 200 Moves Tenants = 
4 rooms @ $SOK = $200K $350K 
(4 apts. @ $7SK) + $SOK 
Transaction Costs of 
Bundling -50 
Profits for Property 
Bundler = 150 
FIGURE 3. The Property Bundler's Equation 
In this sort of multi-party bargain, each tenant is a monopolist with 
an incentive to engage in familiar types of strategic behavior, such as 
holding out for the bundling surplus. ls7 In practice, however, entrepre-
neurs have often been able to keep down the transfer of the economic 
rents from conversion and total transactions costs by coercing komu-
nalka owners. Some property bundlers have achieved conversion 
quickly by intimidating or murdering recalcitrant tenants: 
The trend is particularly noticeable in the centre of [Moscow], where com-
petition for prestigious addresses among members of Russia's emerging 
157 See Robert Cooter, The Cost ofCoase, II J. LEGAL STUD. I, 17-20 (1982). If the komunalka 
owners act strategically, they may increase transaction costs in excess of the net gains from trade, at 
which point the entrepreneur will abandon the deal. Ellickson speculates that adjoining owners 
"are likely to be bound by norms that dictate cooperative behavior in routine interactions." Ellick-
son, supra note ISS, at 1330 n.s6. However, for each tenant, disbanding the komunalka is a one-
shot deal around which such norms may not coalesce. 
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business class and well-heeled foreigners has sent prices soaring. The area 
has many former mansions that the Bolsheviks converted into barracks-like 
communal apartments after the I9I7 revolution. And for the enterprising 
developers there is only one obstacle to reconverting those once-elegant 
buildings to high-quality private housing: the current tenants. ISS 
Rather than walk away from a deal, property bundlers may reveal their 
reserve price by murdering holdouts. In this spatial anticommons, there 
are only a small number of owners, often elderly tenants. 159 An unin-
tended consequence of creating anticommons property during privati-
zation of communal housing has been the creation of a group of komu-
nalka tenants who are particularly vulnerable to predatory private 
property bundlers. Further, the brutal effects of overcoming the komu-
nalka anticommons may have unnecessarily discredited market reforms 
generally. 160 
(b) Transaction Costs and Strategic Behaviors in Bundling. -
What allowed anticommons property in well-situated komunalkas to be 
overcome while ground-floor stores in the same buildings often remain 
empty? The different outcomes are explained in part by five factors 
relating to the transaction costs of bundling and strategic behaviors of 
owners locked in bilateral monopolies:161 
(i) Type of Anticommons Owner: Public or Private. - The transac-
tion costs of negotiating with private owners may be lower than those of 
negotiating with state and corporate parties. Komunalka owners are 
private individuals, often elderly, who are not well-positioned to resist 
concerted market pressures exercised by aggressive entrepreneurs. 
158 Malcolm Gray, Capitalist Crimes, MACLEANS, Jan. 10, 1994, at 17,17. Gray quotes the dep-
uty commander of Moscow's missing persons unit as saying: "Privatization of apartments started 
in October 1991, and it soon led to a new problem: homeowners, most of them old people, started 
disappearing." ld. On this trend, see Bohlen, cited above in note 152; Victoria Clark, Dying To Get 
a Home 0/ One's Own, THE OBSERVER (LONDON), Nov. 28, 1993, at 28; Fred Hiatt, The Dark Side 
0/ Privatization: To Moscow Con Men, Scant Housing is Worth Killing For, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 
1993, atAI; and Warren, cited above in note 152. 
159 See Ulyanova, supra note 153, at 19. 
160 See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences 0/ Public Policy: A 
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 936-40 (1991) (advocating an increased focus 
on the cultural consequences of public policy decisions). It would be interesting to consider further 
the unintended social consequences of property bundling mistakes. By mistaking anticommons 
relations for ordinary private property, people in transition countries have given the idea of a mar-
ket economy a worse reputation than perhaps it merits. "Wild capitalism," a common pejorative 
term to describe the early stages of transition to markets, results perhaps as much from bundling 
mistakes as from any intrinsic element in moving to markets. See Carey Goldberg, Moguls at the 
Gates; Part Robin Hood, Part Robber Baron, Russia's Wild Capitalists Are Skirting the Law, Mak-
ing Fortunes and, Maybe, Saving the Country, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, Magazine, at 22, 23 
("[T]he chaos and illogic of Russia's transition from socialism .•. is now known here as 'wild capi-
talism.'''}; Ann Imse, Russia's Wild Capitalists Take Aluminum/or a Ride, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
1994, at C4 (discussing "the ugly brand of Russia's 'wild capitalism'''}. 
161 Though strategic behaviors may be considered to be a class of transaction costs, see A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 n.lI (2d ed. 1989), in-
stead of a distinct explanatory category, such labeling does not affect the analysis that follows. 
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Komunalka owners in Russia could be tracked down in part through 
propiska records (essentially, internal passport information that identi-
fied each individual in each residence).162 Such records give entrepre-
neurs some assurance that, once all the listed people are bought off, ad-
ditional claimants will not appear.163 Bundlers can avoid holdouts 
among komunalka owners by sharing the economic gains of conversion 
and by engaging in intimidation. By contrast, storefronts began mostly 
with corporate, quasi-state, and state owners. Storefront owners have 
relatively more access to power and protection and may not be as easily 
intimidated by deviant property bundlers. Instead, public and corpo-
rate owners must be bribed. It may be more difficult initially to identify 
whom to bribe, and to enforce such corruption contracts later. Finally, 
public owners may not behave in profit-maximizing ways and may not 
perceive the lost revenue from the storefront to be central to their deci-
sionmaking.164 
(ii) Number of Anticommons Owners/Homogeneity of Interests. -
There are fewer owners, with more homogeneous interests, in komu-
nalkas than in stores, with the result that transaction costs are lower 
and intimidation against komunalka owners is more effective. Even 
with few anticommons owners, familiar problems of bilateral monopoly 
could surface, but they have not in the komunalka case for the reasons 
discussed above. 16S By contrast, in the case of storeowners, there are a 
larger number of corporate and state owners, with more heterogeneous 
interests ranging from current income to long-term bureaucratic sur-
vival. Bribes to one 'bureaucratic owner may not bind other owners 
even within the same organization, at least until such bribery channels 
are routinized. 
(iii) Boundary of the Anticommons. - Each komunalka could be 
easily bounded as private property. Of course, without condominium-
like laws, the status of much of the remainder of the apartment building 
may be unclear. Who controls the land, party walls, fa~ade, hallways, 
roofs, elevators, lobbies, basements, attics, and so on?166 Nevertheless, 
people generally seem to agree that the living area of each apartment is 
the core object of value. By contrast, store boundaries are not as trans-
162 See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 23, at 226; Simona Pipko & Albert Pucciarelli, The Soviet In-
ternal Passport System, 19 INT'L LAW. J. 915, 917 (1985)· 
163 As one author notes: 
For starters, buyers should make sure that the apartment's seller is indeed the owner and 
that the guardians of any children involved have signed off on the deal .... Many realtors 
shy away from flats that already have been sold several times, as each sale increases the 
chance that a past owner will appear to restake his or her claim. 
Jim Kennett, The Home-Buyer's Guide to Nasty Surprises, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file. 
164 See supra note 95 (discussing incentives of public owners). 
165 See supra p. 654. 
166 See Struyk & Kosareva, supra note 126, at 23 (citing presidential decree assigning common 
parts of condominiums to share ownership, but limiting the right of alienation). 
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parent. For example, a workers' cooperative may claim that the single 
bakery that they occupy constitutes the object of property subject to 
their private ownership. Another owner, such as a defunct state bread-
making enterprise, may claim that the entire chain of several dozen en-
terprise bakery outlets is a single, indivisible corporate asset. Indeed, 
underused real estate is often the only potentially valuable asset of for-
mer socialist enterprises. Finally, the local administration may claim 
that all local bakeries belong to it and are thus subject to privatization 
through auction. What is the ordinary boundary of this object of prop-
erty?167 
(iv) Spatial or Legal Anticommons. - Overcoming a spatial anti-
commons such as privatized komunalkas is potentially less difficult 
than overcoming a legal anticommons, in which rights are difficult to 
exchange credibly.168 In a storefront, the problem is not that the space 
was overly subdivided, but rather that legal rights were handed out to 
too many owners. These dispersed rights may be more difficult to de-
lineate and trade than tangible physical control over discrete spaces, 
such as rooms in a komunalka. 
(v) Starting Point in Transition. - Tenants in komunalkas began 
the transition to markets holding more of the familiar bundle of prop-
erty rights than did owners of property such as storefronts. Komunalka 
tenants had rights that gave them most of what families seem to expect 
from ownership, including physical possession and strong rights of ex-
clusion, but without rights of alienation. When komunalkas were pri-
vatized, local governments gave up their socialist control rights, so ko-
munalka tenants received relatively standard legal bundles. By 
contrast, stores often began empty, as part of the holdings of bankrupt 
state and local organizations. Legal rights were scattered among many 
owners, as discussed above in the Moscow storefront case study.169 
(c) Contingent Values in Anticommons Property. - In addition to 
transaction costs and strategic behavior explanations, uncertainty about 
the future may also help explain differences in bundling komunalka and 
store anticommons property. Different types of uncertainty about the 
future give rise to speCUlative value in an object. For example, the "fair 
market value" of an ordinary home includes some premium, however 
slight, for the possibility that oil or diamonds may be discovered under-
neath, and some discount for the possibility that government may ad-
versely change zoning or tax laws. 
Two of these speculative values affect the value of a right in an ob-
ject but do not affect its private property value: what may be called the 
option value and the contingent value. The option value has already 
167 See Frenkel, suPra note 24, at 293-96. 
168 See infra section IV.D (discussing the spatial anticommons problem in the context of property 
allotment to Native Americans). 
169 See sUPra pp. 635-40. 
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been discussed in the komunalka-bundling context. - It reflects the ex-
pected gain from converting anticommons property to private property 
through market transactions - an economic value. The contingent 
value represents the expected gain from rent-seeking that privileges one 
owner at the expense of the others - a political value. Either option or 
contingent value may dominate an anticommons owner's decision on 
how to deploy her rights. 
If the owner believes that the property rights regime will remain 
relatively stable, the option value may determine whether the anticom-
mons property is converted to private property. For example, in komu-
nalkas, tenants often appear to set the option value on their rights at a 
level that allows conversion to go forward. These tenants appear to 
value their contingent or political claims at close to zero, as it is unlikely 
that one anticommons owner in a komunalka will be able significantly 
to improve her position vis-a.-vis another through politics. Komunalka 
tenants can maximize the value of their rights by trading them in eco-
nomic rather than political markets. In trying to capture economic 
rents from conversion, komunalka tenants unintentionally help re-
create the apartment as private property and put it to use. Kiosk own-
ers also probably place no contingent value on holding streets empty, 
because redefining property rights in a way that would legalize the clus-
ters of kiosks is unlikely. Because the alternative to kiosks is to keep the 
streets clear for public access, kiosk owners focus on maximizing cur-
rent economic value. 
Storefront owners may face a similar equation if they expect stabil-
ity in the property rights regime. Given that storefront values in Mos-
cow today are among the highest in the world,170 owners may convert 
their rights into private property when they can overcome transaction 
costs and holdout problems. On the other hand, if owners perceive 
their storefront property rights to be unstable, savvy owners may prefer 
to keep their stores empty, hold onto their rights, and use them as lever-
age in political battles rather than in economic markets. Control of the 
right to maintain or lease out a store may give an individual bureaucrat 
a reason for continued employment and could provide a source of illicit 
income that would dwarf the bureaucrat's formal salary. Additionally, 
political maneuvering may, in time, award the entire private property 
ownership bundle to the current owner of a single right. The contin-
gent value of the right may exceed the option value from conversion. In 
170 See Commercial Space Becoming More Expensive, Moscow NEWS, June 2, 1995, available 
in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file; Russia: Shortage of Office Space Makes Moscow Rents 
World~ Second Highest, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. S, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, World library, Allnws file ("Foreign firms pay an incredible average of DMI25 per sq.m. 
per month [for Moscow office space], compared with DMSo-S5 per sq.m. in London and Paris, 
DM60 per sq.m. in New York and DM45-50 in Chicago and Berlin. Only Tokyo, where a square 
metre costs DM2So, is more expensive than Moscow .... "). 
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this context, keeping the store empty may be a signal of the continuing 
validity of the owner's right, which ensures the value of the contingent 
claim. In unstable regimes, ownership of a dis aggregated property right 
may become a lever for rent-seeking through politics, rather than profit-
maximizing in economic markets. 
The outcomes for owners of komunalka and storefront anticommons 
property are likely to differ (Figure 4). This Figure suggests that a ko-
munalka owner may value the contingent claims at zero and the con-
version option moderately, while a storefront owner may value the con-
version option at zero and the contingent claims quite highly. The 
Figure also assumes that transaction costs for converting a storefront 
are somewhat higher than for a komunalka, because of the relative ho-
mogeneity and ease of intimidation of komunalka owners. The sum of 
these values suggests that the komunalka may ultimately be bundled 
into an ordinary apartment, while the store remains as an anticommons 
and sits empty. 
I Market Value in Private Property Form 
I Anticommons Value I + I Option Value I + I Trans. Costs Komulka is converted 
I Anticommons Value I + I Contingent Value I + I Trans. Costs Storefront is not converted 
FIGURE 4. Differences in Bundling Komunalkas and Storefronts 
4. Conclusion. - For each point along the property gradient, gov-
ernments may be tempted to create anticommons property, perhaps to 
respond to pressure by existing stakeholders, or to address short-term 
distributional concerns. Rather than assigning a usable bundle in a 
scarce resource to a sole owner, governments may assign rights in an ob-
ject to multiple owners, so that many people can get a piece of each pie. 
Governments in transition may have tried to solve too many prob-
lems at once. Although a comprehensive political analysis of why gov~ 
ernments created anticommons property is beyond the scope of this Ar~ 
ticle, several reasons stand out. Decentralization eliminated the control 
rights of many federal actors, but it strengthened those rights at the 
state and local level and often created competing centers of local power. 
Downsizing of government functions created intense competition 
among threatened bureaucrats to hold onto plausible property rights, 
not just because of the corruption potential for individual state actors, 
but also because of a more general desire to preserve their institutional 
existence. Privatization faced resistance from existing stakeholders, 
who demanded protection and inclusion. In many countries, transition 
leaders faced the redistributive challenge by co-opting existing 
stakeholders. In Russia, reformers may have parceled out rights 
broadly to avoid facing the politically challenging prospect of declaring 
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 659 1997-1998
THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
winners who received the entire property bundle and losers who got 
nothing. 
Once anticommons property is created, markets or governments 
may have difficulty in assembling rights into usable bundles. After ini-
tial entitlements are set, institutions and interests coalesce around them, 
with the result that the path to private property may be blocked and 
scarce resources may be wasted.l71 Deviant strategic behaviors, ordi-
nary transaction costs, and contingent values may block bundling. So 
far, storefronts seem to represent a paradigmatic case of the failure of 
bundling and appearance of the tragedy of the anticommons. Under 
some conditions, people will be able to renegotiate around fragmented 
rights through illegal or legal ex post contracts. Kiosks show the bene-
fits and costs of taking the path from anticommons to illegal quasi-
private property. In the case of komunalkas, property bundlers were 
often able to convert anticommons to private property legally, albeit 
against a backdrop of intimidation and violence. At the other end of 
the gradient of property in transition, with respect to individual apart-
ments, governments have avoided creating' anticommons property by 
trading off distributional concerns. 
Overcoming the tragedy of the anticommons is not synonymous 
with creating well-functioning markets in private property. Even with 
full ownership of well-specified formal property bundles, reformers will 
have to be attentive to the familiar difficulties in building markets, in-
cluding the problems of correlating formal rights with informal norms, 
creating a stable economic environment that induces investment, com-
mitting to a credible political order that diverts attention from rent-
seeking, and establishing an effective legal and administrative infra-
structure to enforce contracts and reduce incentives for corruption. 
Bundling property rights to avoid anticommons property is one element 
that may determine whether countries progress to First World prosper-
ity or spiral downward to Third World despond. 
c 
171 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L. REv. 641, 646-
47 (1996). Roe uses the concept of path dependence to explore the consequences of legal rules to-
day on economic outcomes tomorrow. Creation of anticommons property could be an example of 
"path dependence ... [leading] to highly inefficient structures that societr cannot eliminate." I d. at 
647. The standard example of inefficient path dependence is the persistence of the QWERTY 
keyboard, named for the placement of those letters in the keyboard's upper-left comer. See, e.g., 
W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events, 
99 EcoN. J. II6, 126 (1989). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 
33 J.L. & ECON. I, 2-3 (1990) (contending that use of the QWERTY keyboard is efficient, given 
the current understanding of keyboard design). 
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m. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
Property theory has long worked with categories such as private 
property, commons property, and state property.I72 However, the cate-
gory of anticommons property has scarcely figured. This Part makes 
the anticommons a more accessible and precise term for property the-
ory. Section m.A isolates elements of private property that contrast 
with anticommons property. Section m.B explains the limited appear-
ance of the anticommons in the property literature and offers a more 
useful defmition. Section m.e defmes the "tragedy of the anticom-
mons" and explores ways of overcoming the tragedy. 
A. Private Property 
I. This Land Is My Land; This Land Is Your Land. - Few social 
understandings are more deeply intuited and less considered in devel-
oped market economies than core private property rights: for example, 
the sense of "my land" and "your land." When land is sold, sellers, buy-
ers, neighbors, and governments seem to know what constitutes owner-
ship. In the everyday course of business, people exchange property 
through contract but do not create new types of property rights. I73 The 
same intuitive understanding of property in land may extend to private 
property more generally. People know, or think they know,174 what it 
means to own a toaster, car, house, or corporation. People seem to 
know private property when they see it. 
172 These shorthand labels parallel the conventional usage. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank 
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 71I, 715-16 (1980); 
Michelman, supra note 9, at 5-6; Waldron, supra note 122, at 326-33. 
173 Property rights differ from contract rights in that property typically does not represent or 
derive from formal private agreement among individuals defining the content of the relationships. 
The world of contract assumes a pre-existing process for defining entitlements and distributing 
those rights initially among stakeholders, both individual and state. Once rights are defmed and 
distributed, contract represents the ordinary process of voluntary exchange. Ordinary exchange 
through contract can give rise over time to new property rights, as when merchants develop busi-
ness norms, which in tum are codified as property rights. See generally ELUCKSON, sl4pra note 19, 
at 52-64 (discussing the development of extra-legal norms of dispute resolution); Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 
144 u. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1765-1821 (1996) (drawing on the National Grain and Feed Association's 
contract dispute-resolution mechanism to illustrate problems in the externally imposed Uniform 
Commercial Code system); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and 
Nonlegal Sanctiorts on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 133-34 (1996) (collecting the clas-
sic legal-realist and law-and-society sources emphasi2ing the importance of non-legal mechanisms 
in regulating behavior). Similarly, property rights can be created through legislative schemes, not 
just through norm codification: for example, through tradable pollution rights or auctions of bands 
of the radio spectrum. 
174 That people think they know what property is may be enough. As the utilitarian philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham pointed out long ago: "Property is nothing but a basis of expectation .••• There is 
no inlage, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the relation that constitutes property. It 
is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind." JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THEORY OFLEGISLATlON III-12 (Richard Hildreth trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 4th ed. 1987) 
(1931). 
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Of course, even in settled market economies, property rights remain 
unclear on the margins, despite the web of legal,rules, institutions, and 
informal norms.175 Information costs may be one source of ambiguity 
in property rights. For example, it may be too costly to pin down in ad-
vance the exact boundaries of land relative to the gain from certainty.176 
Ambiguity also may arise because of unresolved conflicts and changing 
values regarding ownership, such as how far the government may re-
strict certain land uses without compensation. Nevertheless, most 
workaday activities that require property exchange take place without 
negotiation over the defmition of the thing being exchanged or of the 
constitutive rights of the property bundle. If people thought deeply 
about the property they used, perhaps they would see that even the core 
meanings are historically contingent and indeterminate.177 However, 
the everyday perspective on property masks its mysterious character. 
2. What Is Private Property? - According to the classical theorists, 
"property" is a thing, and "property theory" defmes the relationship be-
tween a person and a thing.17S For example, according to the view 
commonly (though mistakenly) attributed to William Blackstone, the 
right of property is "that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total ex-
clusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."179 Thomas 
Grey explains the power that the classical metaphor holds by situating 
it in a historical context: 
To the rising bourgeoisie, property conceived as a web of relations among 
persons meant the system of lord, vassal, and serf from which they were 
struggling to free themselves. On the other hand, property conceived as the 
control of a piece of the material world by a single individual meant free-
dom and equality of status. ISO 
The cHtssical metaphor of property as thing-ownership still exercises a 
grip on the popular imagination. lSI 
175 As Stephen Munzer notes: "[T]he idea of property is indeterminate at the margin. No litmus 
test can separate rights of property from, say, those of contract in all cases." STEPHEN R. 
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 24 (1990). 
176 Cj. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (1989) (explaining that 
high transaction costs prevent the realization of the full value of an asset). 
177 See MARK. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 259-60, 270-71 (1987); 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 6-7 (1986). 
178 See 2 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES*2. 
179 ld. In fairness to Blackstone, he "would have admitted that his sentence •.. was hyperbolic. 
His treatise explicitly discussed, for example, a variety of legal privileges to enter private land 
without the owner's consent." Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1362 n.237; see also DUKEMINIER & 
KruER, supra note 103, at 99 (same). Ellickson also points out that the concept of property as 
thing-ownership is not original with Blackstone but rather comes from the older civil law tradition, 
a tradition that continues today in much of the world. See Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1377 n.312. 
180 Grey, supra note 4, at 73-74. 
181 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 98-100 (1977) 
(discussing the prevalent layperson's view of property as thing-oWoership); MUNZER, supra note 
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However, during the twentieth century, property theorists have fun-
damentally re-imagined property as a bundle of rights. 182 Contempo-
rary property theorists focus on the relationships owners establish with 
each other regarding use of an object. According to Wesley Hohfeld, 
property "consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privi-
leges, powers, and immunities."183 At this level of generality, the bun-
dle-of-rights metaphor can describe any type of property relationship, 
including private, commons, and anticommons property. The distinc-
tion between private property and other property types depends cen-
trally on three elements: 
(a) The Possibility of Full Ownership. - Private property requires 
that one owner have full decisionmaking authority over an object, sub-
ject to some common law and regulatory limits. More precisely, Frank 
Michelman defines private in the following way: "The rules must allow 
that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully owned by just 
one person. To be 'full owner' of something is to have complete and ex-
clusive rights and privileges over it .... "184 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron 
defmes private property to be a system in which "a rule is laid down 
that, in the case of each object, the individual person whose name is at-
tached to that object is to determine how the object shall be used and 
by whom. His decision is to be upheld by the society as final."185 
(b) Rights and Bundles. - The bundle of rights represents all of the 
infinite number of potential relations and non-relations that people may 
have with each other over any given resource.186 In any particular 
I75, at I6 (contrasting the "popular conception" of property as things with the "legal conception" of 
property as relations). 
182 See DUKEMINIER & KruER, supra note I03, at 86 ("For lawyers, if not lay people, property is 
an abstraction. It refers not to things, material or otherwise, but to rights or relationships among 
people with respect to things."); MUNZER, supra note 175, at 23; Grey, supra note 4, at 69 (distin-
guishing between the metaphors of property as thing-ownership and bundle of rights); J.E. Penner, 
The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 7II, 713-I4, 713 n.8 (I996). 
183 HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 96; see also A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107, I07-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (specifying the standard bundle of rights that 
constitutes ownership). 
184 Michelman, supra note 9, at 5. Michelman, in tum, draws on the work of Hohfeld. See 
HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 96. 
185 Waldron, supra note 122, at 327 (emphasis omitted). These standard definitions of private 
property are assumed in discussions of the transition from socialist to market economies. For ex-
ample, Frydman and Rapaczynski define private property as follows: 
[A] social and economic order defining a new set of expectations that individuals may have 
with respect to their ability to dispose of the assets recognized as 'theirs' by the legal sys-
tem .... The concept of a private property regime is designed to reflect the delicate balance, 
struck by each economically successful society, between private action and state administra-
tion. 
FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 169-70; see also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, 
supra note 2, at 48-49 ("Property rights are at the heart of the incentive structure of market econo-
mies. They determine who bears risk and who gains or loses from transactions."). 
186 For example, in conversation with the author, Brian Simpson notes that full ownership of a 
sweater may include not just the standard rights to sell or lend it to another, but also the non-
standard rights to eat or to bum the sweater. 
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society, however, some subset of rights is likely to be considered essen-
tial, such that, if these rights are pulled from the bundle, we will no 
longer consider a person to be an owner. What property rights make up 
the core of the bundle of rights? A.M. Honore proposed a list of eleven 
"standard incidents" that he claims make up private property, including 
the rights to exclusive possession, personal use, and alienation.187 
Honore's list is now commonly accepted by property theorists as a 
starting point for describing the core bundle of private property rights 
in Western market economies,188 although some theorists challenge the 
inclusion of one incident or another.189 Further, the limits of these indi-
vidual incidents vary from country to country.190 For example, in the 
United States and England, the maximum bundle of ownership rights 
has coalesced in the "fee simple," which incorporates nuanced restric-
tions on each of Honore's eleven incidents.191 Any individual incident 
187 See Honore, supra note 183, at 112-28. Honore lists these incidents as: 
(I) the right to exclusive possession; 
(2) the right to personal use and enjoyment; 
<3} the right to manage use by others; 
(4) the right to the income from use by others; 
(S) the right to the capital value, including alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; 
(6) the right to security (that is, immunity from expropriation); 
(7) the power of transmissibility by gift, devise, or descent; 
(8) the lack of any term on these rights; 
(9) the duty to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others; 
(IO) the liability to execution for repayment of debts; and 
(II) residual rights on the reversion oflapsed ownership rights held by others. 
See id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 49 (I988) (summarizing 
Honore's list of incidents); Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1362-63 (attributing some of these private 
entitlements to a "Blackstonian" bundle). 
188 See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 7-23 
(I977) (integrating Hohfeld and Honore); MUNZER, supra note 175, at 27 n.I4 ("The Hohfeld-
Honore analysis is common among philosophers."); ANDREW REEVE, PROPERTY 14-21 (I986). 
189 Waldron, for example, would leave the prohibition on harmful use out of a list of incidents of 
private property and regard it instead as a more general restriction on action. See WALDRON, su-
pra note 187, at 49. Grey would go further and claim that the notion of property has fragmented 
too much to allow for a general theory of property along the lines suggested by Hohfeld and 
Honore. See Grey, supra note 4, at 74; see also MUNZER, supra note 175, at 31-32 (discussing 
Grey). 
190 For example, the classic trilogy of rights of possession, use, and disposition of property are 
established by the civil law of industrial countries. See Richard A. Epstein, Private Property and 
the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust, 24 NOMOS 48, 57 (I982). 
191 See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (2d ed. I986) (detailing ori-
gins of fee simple in land in England). Ellickson captures Blackstone's image of property as thing-
ownership and transforms it to modern bundle-of-rights terms. See Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 
1362-63. He creates a '''Blackstonian' Bundle of Land Entitlements" that includes: 
- ownership by a single individual C'iliat sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims") 
- in perpetuity 
- of a territory demarcated horuontally by boundaries drawn upon the land, and extend-
ing from there vertically downward to the depths of the earili and upward to the heavens 
- \vith absolute rights to exclude would-be entrants 
- with absolute privileges to use and abuse the land, and 
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may be absent from tlle list in a given country or as to a given owner.192 
Generally, though, if a person controls all or most of these incidents 
with respect to a certain thing, he or she is said to "own" it. 193 In look-
ing at the range of rights on Honore's list and the range of legal regimes 
in the world, Becker notes that "there are a wide variety of sets of rights 
which, when they are held by someone, can justify the claim that that 
person owns something."194 
(c) Restrictions on Extreme Decomposition. - Along with the pos-
sibility of full ownership and a core bundle of rights in each object, a 
third essential characteristic of a private property regime is that it im-
poses some restrictions on "decomposition of full ownership into ... 
rights without their congruent privileges."195 Thus, one private prop-
erty owner is initially endowed with a core bundle of rights in one ob-
ject and is at least nominally free to use his or her object without per-
mission from others.196 Following this initial endowment, the owner 
may break up the bundle of rights, subject to the restriction that he or 
she may not "decompose" the bundle in ways that overly impair the ob-
ject's marketability.197 In the American law of property, numerous re-
straints limit an individual's capacity to break up property bundles too 
much.198 The effect of these rules against decomposition is that prop-
- with absolute powers to transfer the whole (or any part carved out by use, space, or 
time) by sale, gift, devise, descent, or otherwise. 
[d. EIIickson intends the graphic image of the Blackstonian bundle to describe a more general or 
"ideal typicalH form of private property that shares key characteristics across many legal systems. 
[d. 
192 For example, in American law, a person contemplating bankruptcy may sell property at its 
"reasonably equivalent value" but does not have the right to make a gift of the same property. II 
U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 & n.9 (Cal. 
1990) (Mosk, ]., dissenting) (citing bankruptcy law to support the proposition that "some types of 
personal property may be sold but not given away"). Nevertheless, we consider a near-bankrupt 
person to be otherwise a legal owner of his or her property. As to other resources, owners may have 
the right to give away their property but not to sell it. One example would be wild fish or game 
caught or killed pursuant to a license. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 3039,7121 (West 1984); 
see also Moore, 793 P.2d at 510 & n.lO (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that one can own one's inter-
nal organs as property even though one may not have the standard bundle of rights). See generally 
DUKEMINIER & KruER, supra note 103, at 86-87 (discussing market inalienability of some types of 
property); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. 
REv. 931, 937-61 (1985) (noting range of justifications for restrictions on transferability). 
193 See MUNZER, supra note 175, at 22 ("These incidents are jointly sufficient, though not indi-
vidually necessary, for ownership."). Further, each of these incidents can be defined in various 
ways different enough from one another to alter the emphasis and practical consequences of the 
incident. See BECKER, supra note 188, at 19-20. 
194 BECKER, supra note 188, at 22. 
195 Michelman, supra note 9, at 9; see also id. at 8-2 I (defining "compositionH and providing ex-
amples). 
196 Each owner must, however, comply with the normal regulatory constraints in a market 
economy. Honore's bundle does not include the right to be free from such regulation. See 
MUNZER, supra note 175, at 24. 
197 See EIIickson, supra note ISS, at 1374-75; Michelman, supra note 9, at 9. 
198 See EIIickson, supra note ISS, at 1374 ("To deter destructive decompositions of property in-
terests, the Anglo-American legal system has developed a complex set of paternalistic rules .••• 
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erty is generally kept available for productive use, in an alienable form, 
and with a clear hierarchy of decisionmaking authority among those 
who have an interest in the object. 
3· Privileges of Inclusion/Rights of Exclusion. - A useful way to 
understand marketability of "decomposed" bundles is to examine 
whether multiple incidents function as privileges of inclusion or rights 
of exclusion.199 Multiple priVileges of inclusion are non-exclusive. 
Owners of such privileges may use an object without permission from, 
or coordination with, other such owners. For example, in a common 
field or lake, multiple owners may use the property based on their own-
ership of some or all of the incidents in Honore's list, subject to the 
privileges of inclusion of other owners. American property law gener-
ally allows an owner to decompose her bundle by granting multiple 
privileges of inclusion in an object, such as a tenancy in common or 
joint tenancy.200 However, co-owners always have the right to partition 
their undivided common property, with the result that each owner holds 
a core private property bundle in part of the original commons.201 
Rules that govern the interpretation and termination of sub-fee interests also tilt against creation 
and continuation of interests 'repugnant to the fee. ,n (footnotes omitted». 
Under United States property law, one cannot create new types of estates in land. A convey-
ance that purports to limit inheritance to a particular class of heirs creates a fee simple, inheritable 
by heirs generally. See Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (Holmes, J.) ("A man 
cannot create a new kind of inheritance."); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 103, at 2II (dis-
cussing Johnson). The infamous Rule Against Perpetuities also functions to prevent the breakup of 
the standard bundle of property rights over time. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note II, at 82-
85. Contingent grants of property that act as restraints on marriage may be disallowed. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (1983). In the area of 
covenants, the doctrine of changed circUInstances and rules on re-recordation prevent stale restric-
tions from limiting current use of land. Real property taxes and escheat for non-payment can also 
function to prevent people from breaking up property into too small units for too long. See infra 
pp.682-83. 
199 Many of Honore's standard incidents may function as privileges of inclusion or rights of ex-
clusion under certain circumstances. An incident functions as a privilege of inclusion if each owner 
must allow other owners to exercise their incidents in the object. An incident functions as a right 
of exclusion if each owner can block use by other owners. 
Privileges of inclusion and rights of exclusion need not be based on formal legal rights but may 
also reflect informal control rights, such as the ability to delay regulatory approvals. See supra 
note 91 (noting Shleifer's distinction between legal and physical control rights). 
200 See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note II, at 106-14. 
201 See id. at 114. The right to partition joint tenancy and tenancy in common has been avail-
able at common law since 1539. See 31 HEN. 8, ch. 1 (1539) (Eng.), cited in CORNELIUS J. 
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 213 (2d ed. 1988); see also 7 
RICHARD R POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ~ 6°7, at 50-47 to 50-61 (patrick J. Rohan 
ed., 1997) (detailing modern availability of right of partition by sale or in kind). 
As an aside, excess partition in kind of land can create an anticommons as parcels become 
uneconomically small after successive partitions. See infra section Iv.D (discussing analogous frac-
tionation in Native American allotted lands). I believe the modern trend toward partition by sale 
is explained in part by the desire to avoid creating anticommons property in land. 
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By contrast, multiple owners of rights of exclusion in an object each 
have a veto on others' use.202 Such owners may prevent others from 
using the object, based on ownership of some or all of the incidents in 
Honore's list and subject to the rights of exclusion held by other own-
ers.203 An owner can decompose her bundle by granting multiple rights 
of exclusion in an object: for example, by creating restrictive covenants 
enforceable by each owner in a residential land subdivision.204 Again, 
however, American law provides mechanisms that over time usually 
operate to restore a core private property bundle to a single owner.205 
Indeed, there are relatively few cases in the American law of property in 
which multiple owners of privileges of inclusion or rights of exclusion in 
an object cannot escape from each other over time.206 
To summarize, four elements of a private property regime are useful 
for exploring anticommons property. First, private property can be de-
fined in terms of a core bundle of rights chosen from the infinite rela-
tions that may exist among people with respect to a scarce resource. 
Second, ownership of private property includes the possibility that an 
202 Rights of exclusion are as fundamental as privileges of use. In the American law of property, 
for example, the right to exclude others has long been recognized as "one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States,444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also DUKEMINIER & KruER, supra note 103, at 58 (noting that 
Demsetz and Felix Cohen each stress the right of property owners to exclude others); Felix S. 
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 373 (1954) ("Private property is a 
relationship among human beings such that the so-called owner can exclude others from certain 
activities or permit others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the assistance of 
the law in carrying out his decision.,,); Morris R Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL 
L.Q. 8, 12, 21, 26 (1927) (discussing various limitations on property rights, including the right to 
exclude). 
203 The storefront might not sit totally unused, because someone may risk use despite the possi-
bility of removal or sanction by another anticommons owner. See supra notes 98-99. 
204 See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note I I, at 380-89; Susan F. French, Toward a Modem Law 
of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1263-64 (1982). 
20S See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note II, at 392 (noting that, although some states have 
passed statutes "to eliminate stale restrictions after the passage of timer,] ... [m]any states have no 
such legislation and the parties will have to rely on non-statutory methods of extinguishment, such 
as release, merger, waiver, abandonment, and change in neighborhood conditions,,). 
206 One example of inescapable multiple privileges of inclusion would be riparian owners of a 
watercourse who have equal and correlative rights to use the water. See id. at 407. To resolve con-
flicts among owners locked together along the watercourse, American law has developed a doctrine 
of "reasonable use." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (identifying 
nine factors relevant to whether a riparian use is reasonable). 
It is more difficult to imagine a situation in American law in which an owner can create ines-
capable multiple rights of exclusion. One example is the so-called "one stock" rule for the use of 
"profits a prendre" (namely, the right to come onto another's property and remove a resource such 
as fish or timber). See Miller v. Lutheran Conference and Camp Ass'n, 200 A. 646, 651-52 (Pa. 
1938); CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note II, at 377 & n.54 (discussing misapplication of the "one 
stock" rule in Miller); DUKEMINIER & KruER, supra note 103, at 850. According to the "one stock" 
rule, joint owners of a profit must exercise their rights as if they were a single owner. Each can 
block use by the others. There is no provision to partition such a profit if the two owners fail to 
reach an agreement on use. This rule has been criticized as obsolete. See Note, The Easement in 
Gross Revisited: Transferability and Divisibility Since 1945, 39 V AND. L. REv. 109, 128-34 (1986). 
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individual can control all or most of the core bundle, such that the 
owner's decision on inclusion or exclusion will be treated as relatively 
fmal by society. Third, owners may break up the core bundle, subject 
to constraints on decomposition that keep objects available for produc-
tive use, in an alienable form, and with a clear hierarchy of decision-
making authority among owners. Fourth, owners of private property 
may not break up the core bundle by granting too many privileges of 
inclusion or rights of exclusion in an object for too long a time. 
B. Anticommons Property 
I. Previous Definitions. - Anticommons property has received 
scant attention in the property literature. In his I982 article challenging 
the presumptive efficiency of private property, Frank Michelman intro-
duces the equivalent of an anticommons through his speculative defini-
tion of a "regulatory regime."207 He defines a "regulatory regime" to be 
a type of property "in which everyone always has rights respecting the 
objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is ever privileged to use 
any of them except as particularly authorized by the others."208 
Michelman's understanding of the anticommons is derived from a sense 
of abstract legal symmetry. If a regime exists in which all are privileged 
to use whatever objects they wish and in which no one holds exclusion-
ary rights (that is, a commons), then, as a matter of logic, an anticom-
mons also could exist where no one is privileged to use objects and eve-
ryone has the right to exclude.209 
However, Michelman's definition of an anticommons has virtually 
no counterpart in real-world property relations. As a result, property 
theorists have not developed the concept. In contrast with the vast 
number of pages that have been devoted to analysis of private property 
and commons property regimes, the scholarly literature makes only two 
brief mentions of anticommons property following Michelman's intro-
duction of the term. Robert EIIickson omits the anticommons from his 
table of the types of land regimes but mentions it in a footnote as a 
"land regime in which each member of a public owns a right to exclude, 
and consequently for which no one owns a privilege of entry and 
use."210 He imagines one hypothetical example to be "a wilderness pre-
serve that 'any person' has standing to enforce."211 Jesse Dukeminier 
and James Krier define an anticommons as property "to which every-
body has the right to exclude everybody else, and nobody has the right 
207 Michelman, supra note 9, at 6. 
208 [d. 
209 See id. 
210 Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1322 n.22. 
211 [d. 
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to include anybody."212 Using this definition, they pose the existence of 
anticommons property as a question for classroom discussionj213 how-
ever, in my experience, students are unable to come up with real-world 
examples. 
At this level of generality, the anticommons is more of a "thought 
experiment" than a useful category for property theory or policy analy-
sis. In speculating about possible real-world anticommons property, 
property theorists have come up with few candidates, in part because 
they have sought to imagine property that is best used in an anticom-
mons state. Examples include Ellickson's hypothetical wilderness pre-
serve or perhaps a hypothetical nuclear-waste dump.214 Holding such 
property in anticommons form would prevent anyone from being able 
to enter, even if a supermajority of the community were to decide that 
entering was desirable.2ls Each individual in the society would have 
standing to exclude every other individual. Because no one may enter 
without unanimous consent from all holders of exclusion rights, and be-
cause such consent would be nearly impossible to achieve, the resource 
would never be used. Converting a resource to anticommons form 
would ensure its non-use, which may be consistent with the highest so-
cial value of the hypothetical wilderness preserve or nuclear waste 
dump.216 
2. A More Useful Definition. - This Article defmes anticommons 
property as a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective 
rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. This definition departs from 
previous defmitions along four dimensions: the universality of rights of 
exclusion, the implication of non-use as optimal, the formality of rights, 
and the scale of anticommons property. 
First, because Michelman and others define an anticommons to in-
clude only situations in which everyone has a right to exclude, they have 
missed the existence of real-world anticommons property, in which a 
limited group of owners have rights of exclusion. In Michelman's defi-
212 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 103, at 58 (paraphrasing definitions of inclusion and ex-
clusion by Felix Cohen, in article cited above in note 202). 
213 See id. 
214 In discussion with the author, James Krier has suggested a hypothetical nuclear waste dump 
so dangerous that everyone in the community has standing to exclude. 
215 If the object were held as state property, the state may eventually decide that people could 
enter and use land previously set aside as a wilderness preserve. See supra note 122 (defining 
"state property" as a property theory category). The state could employ its ordinary administrative 
mechanisms for reaching such a decision, reserve the decision to a legislature, or put the matter to 
a popular vote. In any of these circumstances, a majority or super-majority could decide to allow 
access. By contrast, if held as an anticommons under Michelman's definition, every single person 
holding a right of exclusion would have to agree before access could be allowed. 
216 According to this example, consent of every single individual in an anticommons would be 
even more difficult to obtain than agreement by the state to use the property, in which perhaps a 
majority would be sufficient. Thus, an anticommons is the most efficient property regime for re-
sources for which no use ever is the best use - a vanishingly small number of real-world cases. 
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nition, a threshold requirement of "near simultaneous unanimous con-
sent"217 ensures that anticommons property will not be used by anyone. 
However, the examples presented in Part II demonstrate that non-use 
can occur even when a few actors have rights of exclusion in a resource 
that each wants to use. 
Second, although perpetual non-use of property may be optimal in a 
few situations, there are more situations in which non-use exists but is 
not socially desirable. Michelman focuses on demonstrating that, in 
theory, alternative property regimes may be as efficient as a private 
property regime. However, the fact that an anticommons may be an ef-
ficient regime for certain types of property does not preclude the possi-
bility that an anticommons may exist even when it is inefficient.21s For 
the resources discussed in this Article, and indeed for most resources 
that people care about, some level of use is preferable to non-use, and 
an anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than the epitome of, opti-
mal use. 
Third, multiple rights of exclusion need not be formally granted 
through the legal system for anticommons property to emerge. For ex-
ample, in the kiosk case in which state authority is quite weak, mafia 
groups hold informal rights of exclusion, which would-be kiosk owners 
must assemble to secure their space.219 By contrast, Michelman focuses 
on what the "legal order" allows or prohibits.220 
Finally, anticommons property may occur at the level of a particular 
use of a scarce resource, rather than at the level of an entire property 
regime. For example, in a komunalka, an individual room may be held 
as private property, while the whole apartment is owned in anticom-
mons form. It is sufficient to note that anticommons property in an ob-
ject may appear at an efficient scale of use, without requiring that all 
possible uses of the object be characterized by anticommons ownership. 
When these four aspects of the previous definitions are modified, the 
idea of anticommons property begins to move from a peripheral to an 
important role for property theory. The term helps identify real-world 
puzzles that are otherwise unexplained and suggests the importance of 
focusing on how rights are bundled. Understanding how anticommons 
property operates may in turn inform practical policymaking. 
217 Michelman, supra note 9, at 6. 
218 Thus, the author disagrees with Ellickson's statement that "[b]ecause anticommonses yield 
no profits, they are typically owned by either governments or nonprofit organi2ations." Ellickson, 
supra note ISS, at 1322 n.22. In conversation with the author, Ellickson noted that property theo-
rists have considered only the possibility of an open-access anticommons, which indeed may be 
rare, and have overlooked the example of a limited-access anticommons, which appears more of-
ten. 
219 See supra pp. 643-44 (discussing informal rights in a kiosk anticommons); see also DE SOTO, 
supra note III, at 19-33 (discussing informal property rights). 
220 Michelman, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
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3. Private Property and Anticommons Property. - The difference 
between private property and anticommons property as defined by this 
Article can be expressed in terms of the bundle-of-rights metaphor. In a 
legal anticommons, rights, .rather than bundles, are the locus of prop-
erty endowments. An object is held as anticommons property if one 
owner holds one of Honore's core rights in an object, and a second 
owner holds the same or another core right in the object, and so on, 
with no hierarchy among these owners' rights or clear rules for conflict 
resolution. Many of the core rights can function as rights of exclusion. 
For example, the owner of a right of possession may be able to prevent 
the owner of the capital value from realizing the value of the asset, and 
vice versa. Unlike owners in a private property regime, owners in an 
anticommons regime must reach some agreement among themselves for 
the object to be used (except perhaps for some relatively low-value uses 
such as day-to-day occupation subject to eviction by other owners221). 
This distinction between private and anticommons property can 
also be expressed graphically (Figure 5). Private property usually 
breaks up the material world "vertically," with each owner controlling a 
core bundle of rights in a single object, subject to allowable forms of de-
composition,222 up to the skies and down to the depths.223 By contrast, 
anticommons property creates "horizontal" relations among competing 
owners of overlapping rights in an object.224 
In Figure 5, boxes I, 2, andJ representfamiliar objects, such as land 
parcels, and the heavy lines represent the initial endowments of prop-
erty rights. The left side of the Figure shows a private property regime, 
characterized by vertical lines separating bundles of core rights in ob-
jects. That is, owner A is initially endowed with a core bundle of rights 
in object I, owner B gets object 2, and owner C gets object 3. By con-
trast, the right side of the Figure shows an anticommons property re-
gime, characterized by horizontal lines separating rights of exclusion in 
each object. An assortment of owners, including A, B, and C, are ini-
tially endowed with rights of exclusion in objects I, 2, and 3.225 
221 This low-value use would still provide less security in occupation than street kiosk use, be-
cause street kiosk use is relatively stable once the proper authorities or mafia members are paid off. 
See supra notes 98-99. 
222 See supra p. 665. 
223 Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos (whoever owns the soil, owns to the 
skies and to the depths). S'ee DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 103, at 138. 
224 A commons property regime might be shown without either horizontal or vertical heavy 
lines. Owners A, B, and C would then each have the privilege to use objects I, 2, and 3 without 
seeking permission from the others. 
225 Note that the anticommons owners of object I are not necessarily the same as those of ob-
jects 2 or 3. Thus, one can imagine owners D, E, and F having rights of exclusion in object 2, and 
owners G, H, and I in object 3. Neither the vertical nor the horizontial endowments of property 
necessarily correspond with any preferred distributive scheme: some owners might control several 
rights or objects, others might have none. 
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FIGURE 5. The Distinction Between Private 
and Anticommons Property 
Private property owner A may decide to divide her core rights in ob-
ject I, perhaps by leasing out a portion or mortgaging her object. The 
effect of this subsequent division by a private owner, however, differs 
from an initial endowment as anticommons property. When antic om-
mons owners are thrown together, there is no hierarchical decision-
making or coordinating relationship among them. By contrast, in mar-
ket legal systems, even if owner A breaks up her core private property 
rights in object I, someone remains an identifiable "owner" who exer-
cises control over the other rights-holders. As discussed above, private 
property regimes have evolved to include rules against excessive de-
composition that make it difficult for an owner to re-create her property 
permanently in anticommons form.226 
The graphical image of the anticommons in Figure 5 can also be 
used to illustrate the distinction introduced in Part II between a legal 
anticommons and a spatial anticommons.227 In a legal anticommons, 
the horizontal lines demarcate core rights of exclusion held by different 
owners. The Moscow storefront is an example of such an anticommons 
because the core bundle of rights - rights of ownership, leasing, use, 
and so on - were initially given to different owners. In a spatial anti-
commons, by contrast, the horizontal lines demarcate the physical sub-
divisions of an object. Each anticommons owner receives a core bundle 
of rights, but in too little space for the most efficient use in the given 
time and place.228 For example, in a komunalka, each owner receives a 
226 See supra p. 665. 
227 A spatial anticommons, though not by this name, has been the subject of some economic 
modeling in the pollution context, in which many owners may be given the individual right to keep 
pollution off their plots unless bought out by the polluter. See v.v. Chari & Larry E. Jones, A Re-
consideration of the Problem of Social Cost: Free Riders and Monopolists 4-7 Guly 1991) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
228 Defining the normal boundaries of an object is difficult, in part because it assumes that an 
efficient or socially optimal scale of use exists. This Article attempts to elide this difficulty by fo-
cusing on objects for which the normal scale of use is reasonably uncontroversial, such as a store or 
an apartment. Even for such objects, however, an efficiency analysis may not easily capture non-
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core bundle of rights in a room, while the preferred use appears to be as 
a single-family apartment. 
4. Commons Property and Anticommons Property. - Anticommons 
property can be further defined in terms of its relationship to commons 
property. In discussing commons property, theorists usually consider 
multiple privileges of use as its defining feature.229 However, C.B. 
Macpherson defmes a commons as a regime in which owners hold 
rights not to be excluded.230 This alternative definition captures the 
close link between anticommons and commons property. In both prop-
erty regimes, there is no hierarchical relationship among owners such 
that society recognizes as fmal the decision of any single owner regard-
ing the object. 
Theorists have usually used commons property to describe a prop-
erty regime that is not private property.231 For example, Michelman de-
scribes a commons as "a scheme of universally distributed, all-
encompassing privilege ... that is opposite to [private property]."232 
More generally, as Yoram Barzel notes, the standard economic analysis 
of property has "tended to classify ownership status into the categories 
all and none, the latter being termed 'common property' - property 
that has no restrictions put on its use. "233 Thus, property theory tradi-
utilitarian values such as the community solidarity that komunalka living could generate. See 
Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, IS PIllL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 352-53 (I986) (ad-
vancing a non-utilitarian rationale for immobility generated by rent controls). But see supra p. 650 
& n.I48 (noting the hostility generated by communal living). 
A different line of criticism argues that no single efficient scale of use exists for some objects be-
cause wealth or framing effects may dominate. See Craswell, supra note I6, at 385-9I (discussing 
wealth effects and framing effects). Defining the "normal" scale of an object becomes even more 
difficult as social conditions change, such as when a city considers using eminent domain to con-
vert a residential neighborhood into an industrial plant. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. I98I). Does one consider the subjective values that 
neighbors experience from living in a vibrant community, or only the objective market value of the 
lots? 
229 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 9, at 5 (explaining that, in a commons, "there are never any 
exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, 
with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons]."). 
230 See C.B. Macpherson, Liberal-Democracy and Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND 
ClunCAL POSITIONS, supra note I22, at I99, 20I. 
231 In describing non-private property, property theorists have characterized ocean fisheries, 
open ranges, fur trapping, potlaching, and gold mining as examples of commons property. See 
ARTHUR F. McEvoy, THE FIsHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA 
FIsHERIES 1850-1980, at 257 (1986) (fisheries); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of 
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18J.L. & ECON. I63, I69-72 (I975) (western land); 
Demsetz, supra note I9, at 35I-53 (fur trappers); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a 
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. I24, I34 (I954) (fisheries); D. Bruce 
Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 
IS J. LEG. STUD. 4I, 4I-42 (1986) (potlaching); John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the 
California Gold Rush, 20J.L. & ECON. 42I, 422-23 (I977) (gold mining). 
232 Michelman, supra note 9, at 9. 
233 BARZEL, supra note I76, at 7I. 
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tionally dichotomizes commons (non-private) property and private 
property.234 
This dichotomy is too limited to capture the diversity of real-world 
property relations. Part IT of this Article has shown that the anticom-
mons idea helps to explain the behavior of property across the gradient 
of property in transition; Part IV will suggest the usefulness of the anti-
commons construct in addressing puzzles in developed market econo-
mies as well. More generally, property relations are better characterized 
as a triumvirate of commons, private, and anticommons.235 
This Article distinguishes anticommons property from private and 
commons property along four dimensions. First, anticommons property 
is a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of 
exclusion to a scarce resource. Second, ownership of anticommons 
property includes the ability by each owner to prevent other owners 
from obtaining a core bundle of rights in an object. Third, keeping 
most objects of value in anticommons ownership means that the objects 
may not be readily alienable, may not be available for productive use, 
and may not be subject to a clear hierarchy of decisionmaking authority 
among owners. Fourth, non-private property may be analyzed either as 
anticommons property if rights of exclusion dominate use, or as com-
mons property if privileges of inclusion dominate. 
C. The Tragedy of the Anticommons 
I. The Anticommons Is Not Necessarily Tragic. - Why should it 
matter if owners hold rights of exclusion, rather than core bundles of 
rights in objects? By itself, the appearance of anticommons property is 
not necessarily a problem for the efficient use of resources. First, in a 
world without transaction costs, owners should rearrange initial en-
dowments through ex post bargaining.236 Such bargains would put re-
sources to their highest-valued use, perhaps by assembling anticom-
mons rights into private property.237 Of course, we do not live in a 
234 An influential strand of scholarship on property rights has come from economists building on 
a commons property analogy. For a sampling, see, for example, BARZEL, cited above in note 176, 
at 71-72; DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: 
A NEW ECONOMIC HIsTORY 23 (1973); and Demsetz, cited above in note 19, at 355-57. 
235 Cj. Michelman, supra note 9, at 3-6 (identifying private property, state of nature, regulatory 
regime, and forced-sharing-of-needs regime). 
236 The classic citation is Coase, cited above in note 16, at 8. Assuming no transaction costs or 
holdouts, owners may keep property in anticommons form and perfectly coordinate its use so its 
performance mimics that of private property. Cj. Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 351, 356 (1991) (explaining the circumstances that give rise to holdouts and free-
riders and the consequences that result). 
237 Even in a world without transaction costs, people would not necessarily bargain to put the 
anticommons resource to a unique use. Because of the presence of wealth or framing effects, there 
may be multiple efficient uses for an anticommons resource, depending on who initially holds the 
rights of exclusion. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, CAROL M. ROSE & BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PER-
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transaction-costless world, as Ronald Coase recognized.238 If people 
hold multiple rights to exclude each other from a resource, they must 
incur the transaction costs of finding out with whom to negotiate. De-
spite the presence of transaction costs, people will be able in many cases 
to negotiate with each other to overcome an anticommons and put the 
property to more efficient use (as in some of the komunalka examples). 
On the other hand, even if the number of parties and transaction costs 
are low, the resource still may not be efficiently used because of bar-
gaining failures generated by holdouts, as sometimes seems to happen 
with Moscow storefronts.239 
A second reason that the appearance of anticommons property may 
not matter for efficient use can be understood by analogy to commons 
property. Elinor Ostrom has shown that people may be able to manage 
non!.private property efficiently by developing and enforcing stable sys-
tems of informal norms.240 Efficient, informal management of property 
in anticommons form could develop over time and could promote cer-
tain communitarian values - for example, cooperation among multiple 
dwellers in a komunalka - that may be lost in a private property re-
gime.241 For some anticommons resources, such as street space .for ki-
osks in Moscow, informal norms seem to have developed that allow 
some use, albeit at a level of efficiency below that of the retail sector in 
a well-functioning market economy. 
Third, some resources may be most efficiently held as anticommons. 
This assertion corresponds to the idea advanced by Carol Rose that 
roads and waterways sometimes may be more efficiently held in com-
mons than in private property form.242 Using my definition of an anti-
commons, one could imagine familiar property rights arrangements, 
such as a scheme of restrictive covenants in a residential subdivision, to 
SPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 207-08 (2d ed. 1995); Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Li-
ability Matter?, I J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25-28 (1972). 
238 See COASE, supra note 18, at 174. 
239 See supra p. 639. See generally Cohen, supra note 236, at 353-56 (distinguishing holding out 
from free riding); Cooter, supra note 157, at 17-19 (noting that, even when transaction costs arc 
zero, disputes over distribution may lead to inefficient results). 
240 See OSTROM, supra note 10, at 58-102 (detailing examples of informal norms successfully 
regulating commons use and avoiding commons tragedy). Robert Ellickson refines this analysis by 
distinguishing closed-access commons such as those described by Ostrom, in which close-knit 
groups may develop efficient norms to conserve scarce resources, from open-access commons, 
which anyone may enter. In an open-access regime, close-knit groups may not be effective in norm 
enforcement, and a tragedy of the commons is more likely to result. See generally ELLICKSON, su-
pra note 19, at 177-82 (suggesting that the effectiveness of informal norms depends on groups 
having adequate information about members and multiple opportunites to sanction and reward 
members). 
241 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 17, at 723,774-81; but see supra note 148 (noting the hostility gen-
erated by communal living). 
242 See Rose, supra note 17, at 723; see also Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 
KYKLOS 319,320-21 (1989) (arguing that, under certain circumstances, property may shift away 
from private to commons ownership when it may be more efficiently used as a commons). 
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be a form of anticommons property. Each homeowner in such a scheme 
holds her unit as private property and holds a veto right, through the 
restrictive covenant, to prevent changes at the community level. To the 
extent that creating such a scheme increases property values more than 
it imposes negative externalities, the developer's decision to convert raw 
land to anticommons form can be an efficiency-enhancing move.243 In 
the transition economy context, however, anticommons property was 
not created for efficiency-maximizing motives, but rather was the unin-
tentional result of decisionmaking by governments acting under politi-
cal and economic constraints. 
Finally, property theorists have shown that the efficiency of a prop-
erty regime cannot be derived ex ante from a limited set of axioms, such 
as the assumption of rational, self-interested individuals.244 In the typi-
cal commons, with multiple privileges of use, one worries about overuse 
by rational actors.245 But one can imagine underuse of a commons de-
spite multiple privileges of use. For example, if a common pond had a 
rule that any community member could appropriate fish until the mo-
ment of consumption, people might prefer to wait on shore and poach 
others' catches rather than invest in boats and bait. Whether under-
fishing or overfishing happens on "Poach Pond" will depend on the 
gains from fishing and the costs of netting the catch and fending off 
poachers.246 
243 It is worth reiterating that private property systems place limits on an owner's ability inten-
tionally to create such an anticommons because of the risk that the anticommons may outlive its 
economic value arid paralyze future use. 
244 Kennedy and Michelman disprove the presumptive efficiency of private property as an ab-
stract proposition. For example, in a commons that people can pillage, farmers might nevertheless 
not be discouraged from planting. Instead, farmers may plant more so that they end up with a rea-
sonable amount of food after others have pillaged. At this level of abstraction, the commons might 
be more efficient than private property if farmers are more efficient than poachers at farming. See 
Kennedy & Michelman, supra note I72, at 7I8-I9; see also James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, Part Two, IS HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 325, 338 n.44 (I992) (discussing the contradic-
tory need for cooperation from self-interested individuals when creating a private property re-
gime); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 38-39 (I990) (arguing that classical property theorists 
resort to narrative gambits, rather than deriving the creation of private property from ex ante prin-
ciples). 
245 Demsetz gives the example of fur trapping among Labrador Indians. Before the advent of 
the fur trade, animals were held in common, and trappers took what they needed for themselves 
and their families. The increased commercial value that came with trade led to hunting on an in-
creased scale and the depletion of fur stocks. Each trapper could gain the benefit of selling furs 
without taking into account the externalities imposed by free hunting. See Demsetz, supra note I9, 
at 35 I-53· 
246 I am indebted to William Miller for this point. Miller notes that property theorists often con-
fuse commons property regimes with commons property assets within a larger private property 
regime. In a commons property regime, in which the fish remain subject to others' rights of use 
after being caught, no tragedy of overuse may occur, because people might not fish at all. The 
tragedy of overuse often occurs only in the latter case, in which individuals can transform common 
assets such as fish into private property and where a market for such privately owned fish exists. 
Thus, the tragedy of the commons, like the tragedy of the anticommons, is a problem only within 
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Similarly, one can imagine overuse in an anticommons. For exam-
ple, assume California has a property regime such that any community 
member - environmental group, neighbor, or local government agency 
- could block development of a coastal plot. Nevertheless, the Cali-
fornia coast might still be overbuilt relative to an efficient level (as-
suming neighborhood and environmental externalities are internalized), 
if exercising a right of exclusion is sufficiently costly. Each community 
member may prefer to wait for the others to block the development. 
Thus one can imagine that "free riding" coastal property owners and 
government agencies might fail to block overbuilding.247 Whether un-
der- or overbuilding happens in the "Free Ride Coast" anticommons 
cannot be determined abstractly. It depends on the gains from devel-
opment and the external costs imposed, including the costs of exercising 
rights to exclude (Figure 6). 
OVERUSE UNDERUSE 
COMMONS 1. Demsetz's Forest 2. Poach Pond 
ANTICOMMONS 3. Free Ride Coast 4. Moscow Storefronts 
FIGURE 6. Resource Use in Commons and Anticommons Property 
The real-world effect of multiple rights of exclusion or privileges of 
inclusion in an object is not a theoretical absolute, but rather an empiri-
cal matter. Boxes 2 and 3 are theoretically possible (as is optimal use 
per Ostrom's and Rose's observations). Practical examples, however, 
seem to fall mostly in Boxes I and 4, such as in the Labrador forest dis-
cussed by Demsetz,248 and in the Moscow storefronts discussed by this 
Article. Expectations about overuse or underuse of property, and our 
policy responses, must be grounded in experience and observation. 
2. Commons and Anticommons Tragedy. - Although the commons 
and the anticommons are not necessarily tragic, they often will be in a 
world of positive transaction costs, strategic behavior, and imperfect in-
formation. To the extent one believes that a "pessimistic view of human 
the context of a market economy and does not exist intrinsically within the category of commons 
property. 
247 See Cohen, supra note 236, at 351-52 (defining free riders). 
248 See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 351-53. Though the theoretical contributions of Demsetz's 
work are robust, the empirical foundations of his article have been critici2ed. See, e.g., WILUAM 
CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 184 n.7 (1983) (explaining that Demsetz "misconstrue[s] the 
social and ecological nature of property rights"); DUKEMINIER & KruER, supra note 103, at 61-62; 
Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 740 n.73 
(1985) (critici2ing Demsetz's use of "incomplete historical data"). 
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capacity for trustful cooperation"249 is a good predictor of behavior, the 
tragic cases may be dominant. On the other hand, to the extent one has 
a more optimistic understanding of human nature, one might expect 
that people will find efficient management strategies both for commons 
and for anticommons resources.250 This section briefly defmes the par-
allel tragedies of wasted resources that may occur in a commons and in 
an anticommons. 
A tragedy of the commons can occur when too many individuals 
have privileges of use in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational 
individuals, acting separately, may collectively overconsume scarce re-
sources. Each individual finds that she benefits by consumption, even 
though she imposes larger costs on the community. Using my defmi-
tion, the anticommons is prone to the inverse tragedy. A tragedy of the 
anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of ex-
clusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, 
acting separately, may collectively waste the resource by undercon-
suming it compared with a social optimum. 
When an owner of a common pond catches a fish, she gains because 
she can eat or trade the fish. An owner benefits from keeping a store-
front empty, in contrast, by excluding others because exclusion pre-
serves the value of the right, perhaps for later trade to property bun-
dlers, or perhaps for use in rent-seeking.251 The right of exclusion is 
valuable precisely because others want to use the resource and will pay 
something to collect the right. Keeping a Moscow storefront empty is 
relatively inexpensive because an owner need only drive by now and 
then to peer in the windows. Monitoring costs increase when the store 
is occupied and each owner must ensure that the use does not exceed 
the permission granted.252 If a property bundler can use the store with-
out acquiring some owner's rights, those rights no longer function as 
rights of exclusion and may decline in value. 
3. Overcoming Anticommons Tragedy. - There are several ways to 
overcome anticommons tragedy while still keeping property in anti-
commons form. For example, as discussed above, close-knit groups 
may over time develop informal norms that help them manage the re-
249 Michelman, supra note 9, at 29. As Hardin notes: 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons .... 
[For example, in the pollution context,] [t]he rational man finds that his share of the cost 
of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes be-
fore releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling 
our own nest." 
Hardin, supra note 10, at 1244-45. 
250 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 10, at 182-85. 
251 See supra pp. 657-59 (discussing possible contingent values of anticommons rights). 
252 See Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1327-28 ("Monitoring boundary crossings is easier than 
monitoring the behavior of persons situated inside boundaries. For this reason, managers are paid 
more than night watchmen." (footnote omitted». 
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source relatively efficiently. However, informal norms are not a likely 
solution in many cases in which an anticommons develops, such as 
when one-shot deals convert komunalkas into individual apartments, or 
when anticommons owners are not close-knit, as in the Moscow store-
fronts. 
In the commons case, property theorists have proposed that societies 
may overcome tragedy by evolving toward private property relations. 
For example, Demsetz suggests that communities move to private prop-
erty in a resource when technological or population pressures increase 
the differential between individual gain and social COSt.253 When the 
effects of resource use are fairly localized, private property better aligns 
each owner's interest with the efficient level of use because each owner 
faces the full costs of overconsumption.254 In other words, the private 
property owner internalizes externalities for which the commons owner 
need not account.255 The theoretical arguments on the commons carry 
over, by analogy, to the problem of overcoming an anticommons. In the 
anticorrimons case, moving to a private property regime may better 
align each owner's interest with efficient use, because a private prop-
erty owner faces the full cost of underconsumption. 
The puzzling question, then, is by what mechanism resources shift 
from commons or anticommons form into private property. This ques-
tion is underdeveloped in the literature on the economics of property 
rights, except for a vague evolutionary story.256 In time, much anti-
commons property, including the examples discussed in Part IT, will 
probably be converted into private property, although the process may 
be brutal and uneven. Markets will rapidly convert assets with the 
largest differential between anticommons and private property values, 
the lowest transaction costs of conversion, and negligible contingent 
value for rent-seeking. The mechanisms for conversion of other anti-
commons property are less clear.257 
253 See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 350. 
254 See Ellickson, supra note ISS, at 1327-30. In addition, to the extent there are some spillover 
effects in resource use, private property reduces the number of people with whom an owner must 
negotiate. See id. at 1330. By reducing the number of decisionmakers, private property reduces 
the transaction costs of internali2ing the remaining externalities. 
255 See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 356. 
256 Carol Rose has noted the vague quality of the classical story and has explored the narrative 
gambits that classical theorists use to describe the shift from commons to private property. See 
Rose, supra note 244, at 37-40; see also Krier, supra note 244, at 338 & n.44 (noting that the stan-
dard economic accounts of property contain a contradictory story for cooperation by self-interested 
individuals when they create private property regimes). Ellickson takes up the challenge "to iden-
tify a collective-action mechanism through which a group would succeed in generating cooperative 
land rules [by offering] some speCUlations on evolutionary dynamics of property in land." EIlick-
son, supra note ISS, at 1321 n.I9. He suggests a focus on the dynamics of close-knit groups for the 
evolution of efficient norms within the group. See id. at 1366. 
257 The enclosure of the medieval open fields perhaps offers a parallel to the conversion of Mos-
cow anticommons property. The shifts in both property regimes appear to enhance efficiency 
overall, while dispossessing and brutalizing certain groups. Both shifts were accomplished partly 
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Part IT of this Article proposed some paths out of the anticommons 
toward private property, based on either market or regulatory mecha-
nisms. But these paths are fraught with difficulty: markets may fail be-
cause of transaction costs and strategic bargaining, and governments 
may fail because of the cost and administrative complexity of compen-
sation and the fear of demoralizing potential investors by reforming 
property rights without compensation. Although some anticommons 
resources may make the transition to private property, many other 
valuable resources may remain stuck on a poorly-performing path. 
What is to be done?258 
Iv. ApPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Empty storefronts are not an idiosyncratic artifact of post-socialist 
transition. Anticommons property appears more often than might at 
first be expected, in guises ranging from the trivial to the tragic. It may 
emerge both in transition and in developed market economies, when-
ever governments define new property rights. This Part very briefly 
sketches four practical applications that indicate the range of the anti-
commons idea and directions for future research.259 
Section Iv.A, on enterprise privatization, shows how an anticom-
mons analysis could help explain the poor performance of privatized 
state enterprises. When privatizing many classes of state assets, transi-
tion governments may have excessively fragmented rights. In market 
economies, legal systems have developed mechanisms that usually in-
through market forces and partly through legislative fiat. See Ellickson, supra note ISS, at I39I-
92 (discussing the mixed record of the enclosure movement and citing the relevant literature). 
258 Although the question comes from Lenin, one answer may lie in game theory-modeling of the 
anticommons, a direction for future research. 
259 Within United States law, powerful applications of the anticommons idea appear often in the 
intellectual property and the land use areas. In a forthcoming article, Rebecca Eisenberg and I use 
an anticommons analysis to show how increased patentability of basic biomedical research may 
lead to the development of fewer useful pharmaceutical products. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra 
note 20, at I-2. Another intellectual property example occurs in the emerging multimedia field, in 
which multiple ownership and licensing requirements could create a" Brady Bunch anticommons." 
Use of The Brady Bunch has required agreement from each of the actors portraying Brady kids 
(and their parents, while the actors were still minors), the Brady parents, and the Brady house-
keeper, Alice - as is typical of licensing agreements for such shows. The difficulty of getting 
agreement, particularly from Maureen McCormick ("Marcia Brady,,), is reported in BARRY 
WILLIAMS & CHRIS KRESKI, GROWING Up BRADY I39, I49, IS3 (I992). I am indebted to Carey 
Heckman for this multimedia application. 
In the land use area, permitting processes with multiple layers of state and local agency ap-
provals could create a "planning anticommons." See, e.g., WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS 
OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 224-
26 (I98S) (noting that multiple parties acting with and through land use commissions have rights to 
delay and effectively exclude development). Similarly, restrictive covenants may function to create 
a "redevelopment anticommons" when neighborhood associations overenforce covenants despite 
changed conditions. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. 
REv. 906, 920-26 (I988); Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Seruitudes, 73 CORNELL L. 
REv. 956, 956-63 (I988) (replying to Epstein). 
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hibit private owners from fragmenting their rights too much for too 
long. The ~ig Inch Giveaway example in Section N.B highlights sev-
eral of these bundling mechanisms. Sometimes, however, governments 
disable or overwhelm the bundling mechanisms. For example, since 
World War II, the Japanese government has given private individuals 
too many veto rights in urban redevelopment decisions. The Kobe 
earthquake material in Section N.e shows the consequences of creating 
an anticommons in an established market economy. Mter governments 
fragment rights, overcoming the resulting tragedy of the anticommons 
may prove difficult, both for private individuals and for government 
decisionmakers. The final section, on Native American Land, shows 
how anticommons tragedy can persist for many decades after mistakes 
in the initial allocation of property rights. 
A. Rapid Enterprise Privatization and Slow Restructuring 
Enterprise reform has been the most discussed, and most puzzling, 
point in the literature on the transition from socialism.260 Despite rapid 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, many of these newly private 
firms have not yet begun to restructure their operations in a market-
oriented direction.261 The anticommons prism might usefully reflect on 
this puzzle. 
In Russia, for example, the fragmentation of ownership of the so-
cialist firm might help to explain the slow pace of change. Privatization 
broke up the socialist bundle of corporate governance rights among a 
heterogeneous set of managers, workers, and local governments.262 
These new owners may now hold excessive rights of exclusion, such 
that each prevents the others from restructuring corporate assets.263 To 
260 For a useful introduction to the literature, see WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, cited above 
in note 2, at 15 I-52 (providing an annotated bibliography on enterprise privatization). An analysis 
of the role of anticommons property in enterprise privatization is beyond the scope of this Article. 
261 See id. at 50-58 (providing a brief overview of goals, methods, and outcomes of enterprise 
privatization in transition countries). 
262 Andrei Shleifer, one of the architects of the 1992-1993 Russian mass privatization program, 
said that his fundamental goal was "to consolidate the removal of control rights over firms from 
the central bureaucracy and to allocate those rights to enterprise managers and shareholders." 
Shleifer, supra note 3, at II2; see also BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 71, at 60-66 
(noting that privatization and corporatization provide the reformer with the most efficient means 
of ownership); ROMAN FRYDMAN, ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI & JOHN S. EARLE, THE 
PRIvATIZATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE BALTIC STATES 76-77 (1993) (stating 
that the purpose of recent corporatization has been to "make enterprises managerially more inde-
pendent from managerial administration"); CHERYL W. GRAY & KATHRYN HENDLEY, WORLD 
BANK, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 1528, DEVELOPING COMMERCIAL LAW IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES: EXAMPLES FROM HUNGARY AND RUSSIA 21-26 (1995) (discussing the 
move toward enterprise autonomy as well as privatization in Russia). 
263 See Rapaczynski, supra note 13, at 100 ("Maximizing the value of the firm is often not the 
most important objective of these insiders. Maximizing employment, for example, is clearly impor-
tant for the employees. The management is often busy plundering corporate assets .••• All the 
while, the insiders try to disempower the minority outside owners .••. "). 
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gain support for rapid privatization from socialist-era stakeholders, 
Russia may have transferred socialist ownership at the state level to an-
ticommons ownership at the plant level. 
Similarly, in Hungary, corporate insiders such as plant managers 
were able to hold onto their rights of exclusion when the government 
took control of, and then privatized, large enterprises. 264 New owners 
of Hungarian enterprises now find that their assets may come with old 
owners still hanging onto control. By contrast, the Czech Republic has 
tried to create dominant outside owners to act as "a powerful lobby for 
the interests of shareholders not otherwise related to the corpora-
tion."265 Perhaps Czech enterprises will be able to restructure more 
quickly because they did not create anticommons enterprise property 
during privatization. Their more coherent bundling of corporate-
governance rights, however, may come at the expense of setting aside 
distributional concerns of existing managers, workers, creditors, and lo-
cal governments.266 
Finally, China has experienced tremendous economic growth,267 
particularly among "township and village enterprises,"268 apparently 
without "clearly dermed" property rights.269 While analysts such as 
Andrei Shleifer suggest that clarifying rights will prove essential to con-
tinued growth,270 the anticommons perspective suggests that clarifying 
property rights may be only part of the story. Political and fiscal decen-
tralization in China may have kept the core bundle of property rights 
264 Rapaczynski elaborates on this point: 
Hungary has standard property rights on the books, but perhaps the most confusing and 
fragmented ownership structure in the world. Here, because the state was never able to re-
gain its own full ownership rights to the nominally state property, it was never really able to 
transfer those rights to new owners. As a result, managers of former state firms used this 
vacuum to perpetuate their control through a series of cross-ownerships, joint ventures, 
pyramids of holding companies, legal entities created solely to hold debts or liabilities, and 
other structures so arcane as to leave much of the productive assets in Hungary with no 
conventional owners at all. 
Id. (citing David Stark, Networks of Assets, Chains of Debt: Recombinant Property in Hungary in 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 109-SO (Roman Frydman, Cheryl 
W. Gray & Andr2ej Rapaczynski eds., 1996». 
265 Id. at 101. 
266 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at 56 (noting the success of dominant 
shareholders in spurring restructuring of privatized Czech enterprises). 
267 See, e.g., John Ross, Economic Reforms: Success in China and Failure in Eastern Europe, 46 
MONTHLY REv. 19, 19,27 (1994); Jeffrey Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, China's Transition Experience, 
Reexamined, TRANSITION (World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1996, at I, I, 3. 
268 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT, supra note 2, at viii ("'Township and village enterprises' 
are a form of enterprise organization unique to China in which local government owns all or most 
of the enterprise but local individuals hold implicit property rights."). 
269 David W. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of 
Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMPo ECON. 1,3 (1993). 
270 See Shleifer, supra note 3, at 106 ("[T]he efficiency of Chinese village enterprises is fragile. 
Unless local bureaucrats effectively privatize these firms through full nomenklatura privatization, 
at some point the village enterprises are likely to suffer the same afflictions as public firms else-
where in China and the rest of the world. "). 
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relatively intact at the local level. Even though rights are not "clearly 
defmed," perhaps a sole decisionmaker can exercise effective control 
over assets of each "township and village enterprise." If further re-
search confirms this hypothesis about Chinese enterprise reform, the 
content of bundles of control rights may be even more important than 
the clarity of those rights during transition.271 
These enterprise examples suggest that transition policy should fo-
cus on the particulars of property bundling during political decentrali-
zation and enterprise privatization, the paths by which anticommons 
property is either formed or avoided. 
B. The Quaker Oats Big Inch Land Giveaway 
This Article borrows from one of the most successful promotional 
gimmicks in advertising history to show how market legal systems pre-
vent individuals from creating spatial anticommons property.272 In a 
I955 radio broadcast, the fictional "Sergeant Preston of the Yukon" 
promised every child who purchased a box of Quaker Oats cereal a 
deed for one square inch of land in the Yukon.273 The advertising ex-
ecutive who thought up the idea flew to the Yukon and bought about 
nineteen acres on behalf of Quaker Oats.274 Quaker Oats then trans-
ferred the land to a subsidiary that subdivided the land into square-inch 
parcels, printed up deeds, and packed them in twenty-one million spe-
cially marked boxes of cereal, which flew off the shelves.275 
The twenty-one million deeds live on and have generated a lore of 
their own. One deed owner offered to donate his three square inches to 
create the world's smallest national park; another declared indepen-
dence on his.276 One young boy sent the local title office four toothpicks 
so they could fence in his inch,277 neglecting to note that the "language 
on the deeds said that each owner must acknowledge the right of every 
other owner to cross his inch at will."278 Unfortunately for deed hold-
ers, Quaker Oats never registered the subdivision and never paid taxes 
271 The differences between Chinese and Russian enterprise reform are profound. See, e.g., 
Sachs & \Voo, supra note 267, at I. An anticommons explanation is one factor, among many others, 
that may account for the apparent success of China and apparent failure of Russia. 
272 "And so began the Great Klondike Big Inch Land Caper, one of the most successful sales 
promotions in North American business history." Andrew H. Malcolm, Quaker Oats' Land Scam: 
A Casefor Sgt. Preston, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,1980, at F7 (reporting that on Jan. 27, 1955, Quaker 
Oats began placing "legal-sounding" deeds to one square inch of Yukon land in each box of Puffed 
Rice and Puffed Wheat). 
273 Id. ("[T]he promotion was begun on the Sergeant Preston radio show, which despite the 
husky barks and Yukon wind sound effects, originated in Detroit. "). 
I. 
274 See Bob Greene, Give Them an Inch, and They'll Buy Oats, Cm. TruB., July 7, 1987, § 5, at 
27S See id. 
276 See Malcolm, supra note 272. 
277 See id. 
278 Greene, supra note 274 ("Also, it was speIJed out that no mineral rights were involved •.• .'? 
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on the land, which escheated whole to the Canadian government in the 
mid-Ig6os.279 Not surprisingly, others have imitated the Quaker Oats 
promotion: now it is possible to buy a deed that conveys one square 
inch in all fIfty states/80 and even to buy one square foot of the ranch 
where the television series Dallas was filmed.281 
Well-functioning market economies appear to contain a number of 
mechanisms that encourage owners to create high-value anticommons 
property and that limit owners' ability to create a low-value anticom-
mons. As a profIt-maximizing fIrm, Quaker Oats had an incentive to 
create the most valuable Big Inch anticommons that it could. Also, the 
Canadian government reserved access and mineral rights for itself.282 
Thus, the legal regime allowed Quaker Oats to create anticommons 
property as to some uses of the land, while the land was kept as private 
property for other purposes.283 In addition, the requirements that own-
ers incur the costs of registering title and paying property taxes, and the 
subsequent escheat of the land for failure to do so, functioned as power-
ful mechanisms to return the low-value spatial anticommons created by 
Quaker Oats to a bundle of usable private property. 
More generally, such mechanisms ensure that decisions by private 
owners to create anticommons property will not paralyze the alienabil-
ity of scarce resources for too long or diminish their value too drasti-
cally. If the recipients had registered the deeds, and if the government 
had not levied any taxes) it is unlikely that anyone would have ever 
279 See Greene, supra note 274 ("'The individuals who had received the deeds in the cereal boxes 
had become the owners of the land,' [a Quaker Oats employee] said. 'Obviously, none of them ever 
paid taxes on it. So the ownership of the land went back to Canada. The promotion was long 
over, anyway.'''); Malcolm, supra note 272 ("[The government] repossessed all the land back in 1965 
for nonpayment of $37.20 in property taxes."). 
280 See Bill Cunniff, Catalog Can Help Rehabbers in Hunt for Right Item, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 
29, 1993, at 35 (reporting that, according to Scott Moger, who created the deeds, "[i]t was just as 
hard getting the legal approval as it was acquiring the land. I had a highfalutin legal firm looking 
into it. "); Rick Hampson, Looking for Piece of Land? He'll Take Care of It for You, Cm. TRIB., 
Dec. I, 1991, at 2A ("After some legal maneuvering- 'I spent more on lawyers than land' - [Mo-
ger] was cleared by New York state and the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
ruled he was selling a novelty gift item, not an investment. "); see also Nina Munk, A Cheap Ticket 
to the Promised Land?, FORBES, Feb. I, 1993, at 90, 90 ("There'S a strong suspicion that poor Chi-
nese customers are being had. Some of them seem to believe that owning even a tiny slice of 
America increases one's chances of winning U.S. citizenship or at least a visa. "). 
281 As one article noted: 
Now the same gimmick is being used to populari2e not cereal but a serial .... "We have ac-
tual deeds we send out with the documents to transfer the land to the new buyer," U.R.] 
Duncan said. Those who buy the land will have only limited rights to it [not including 
grazing rights] .... Mr. Duncan has also arranged to pay property taxes so the city clerk will 
not have to send thousands of assessment bills around the world. 
Real Estate in Texas, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1980, atDl9. 
282 See Greene, supra note 274. 
283 The medieval open field system offers an analogy. Ellickson suggests that the system created 
commons property as to uses for which there were efficiencies of scale, such as harvesting, fencing, 
shepherding, and private property as to uses for which there were no scale efficiencies, such as 
planting, weeding, and thinning. ElIickson, supra note ISS, at 1391. 
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used the land again once ownership had been broken up at the square-
inch level. (One collector did amass 10,800 of the Quaker Oats deeds 
and asked the company to consolidate them into one parcel of "his 
land," comprising about seventy-five square feet, but the company dis-
suaded him.284 He eventually profited by selling the deeds as collecti-
bles.285) 
C. Post-Earthquake Reconstruction of Kobe, Japan 
Unlike in the Quaker Oats case, the mechanisms to prevent emer-
gence of anticommons property have failed dramatically in Japan. 
When these mechanisms fail and governments accidentally create anti-
commons property, interests vest, and the consequences can last for 
decades or more. Japan's residents pay the highest prices for housing in 
relation to income of any industrialized country in the world,286 in part 
because of the "world-class tangle of real-estate laws, a thicket that 
makes New York's labyrinth of rent regulation look simple by compari-
son."287 In Japan, the costs of failure to prevent the emergence of anti-
commons property appeared recently during the rebuilding following 
the 1994 Kobe earthquake. Although $30 billion has flowed into the 
city, and highways, held in undivided state ownership, have been re-
built, much of the rest of the city still lies in rubble, because "a single 
angry tenant can block urban renewal. And does."288 
Anticommons property has appeared because of mistakes in J apa-
nese land laws enacted after World War II. Under these laws, some 
land in Kobe has been divided to the point where there are "thousands 
of parcels the size of a U.S. garage," and a building "can be based on a 
plot that is actually dozens of smaller parcels thrown together by devel-
opers."289 In one block of Kobe, over 300 renters, lessees, landowners, 
and subletters own often-overlapping claims, and each one must agree 
before rebuilding can go forward.290 According to a city official, "[i]t's 
like trying to get thousands of little corporate presidents to agree on one 
plan."291 
Once anticommonsproperty has been created, it is difficult to find a 
way out. Japan faces a set of historical and cultural constraints on local 
government intervention. "The city could conceivably evict any tenant 
284 Michael Gershman, Try, Try Again, FOOD & BEVERAGE MARKETING, Dec. 1990, at 28, 32; 
see also Joseph P. Mastrangelo, Protoco~ Presidents and the Yukon Rush, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 
1978, at Dl ("The deeds were not in sequence and the great land grab fizzled out.'? 
285 See Gershman, supra note 284, at 32. 
286 WORLD BANK, supra note 49, at 97. 
287 Jathon Sapsford, Quake-Hobbled Kobe Shows How Land Law Can Paralyze Japan, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996, at AI. I am indebted to James Krier for suggesting this application. 
288 [d. 
289 [d. 
290 See id. 
291 [d. 
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or landlord and buy the land under laws of eminent domain. But Japa-
nese authorities frequently decline to seize property because of the na-
tion's preference for harmony and consensus. "292 Instead, several years 
after the Kobe earthquake, seven out of ten buildings remain damaged 
or in rubble; rebuilding plans are set, but are blocked by owners.293 
"[T]he only bargaining chips left to the participants in this debate are 
property rights."294 The effect of bad real property law spreads beyond 
housing costs: 
The whole system is a drag on the economy and can even pose trade barri-
ers. Japan's bad loan crisis will take years to mop up, in part because 
squatters and deadbeat debtors have such strong rights to stay put. To-
kyo's Narita Airport is still unfinished 18 years after opening, because 
farmers refuse to give up land on what would become a second runway.295 
D. Fractionation oj Native American Allotted Lands 
The facts behind the Supreme Court decisions in Hodel v. Irving296 
and Babbitt v. Youpee 297 graphically illustrate how government mis-
takes in breaking up the core bundle of property rights have created an-
ticommons property in the United States, and how difficult it is subse-
quently to rebundle property sensibly. In the 1880s, Congress enacted a 
series of Land Acts that dismantled many Native American reserva-
tions and allotted 160 acres of communal lands to Native American in-
dividuals, with heads of households receiving 320 acres.298 In part to 
protect Native Americans from white settlers, the United States held 
these lands in trust, and the Native Americans could not alienate or 
partition the parcels.299 In practice, individuals could transfer land 
only through devise or, in most cases, through intestacy.300 
As the Court noted in Hodel, "[t]he policy of allotment of Indian 
lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians .... Because the land 
was held in trust and often could not be alienated Qr partitioned, the 
fractionation problem grew and grew over time."301 As early as 1928, 
292 !d. 
293 See id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 481 U.S. 704 (1987). See generally Ronald Chester, Is the Right to Devise Property Constitu-
tionally Protected? - The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. Il9S, Il97-98 (199S) 
(analyzing Hodel). 
297 Il7 S. Ct. 727 (1997). The underlying factual issues in Babbitt are the same as in Hodel. 
298 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 701>-07; see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 61S-16 (1982 ed.) ("[A]llotment is a term of art in Indian law, describing either a parcel of land 
owned by the United States in trust for an Indian ('trust' allotment), or owned by an Indian sub-
ject to a restriction on alienation in favor of the United States or its officials ('restricted fee' allot-
ment)."). 
299 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 707. 
300 See id. 
301 Id. 
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Congress realized that the program was not working and that "[g]ood, 
potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst great pov~ 
erty, because of the difficulties of managing property held in this man~ 
ner."302 In trying to reform the allotment program in I934, one member 
of Congress noted, 
[T]he administrative costs become incredible .... On allotted reservations, 
numerous cases exist where the shares of each individual heir from lease 
money may be I cent a month .... The Indians and the Indian Service per-
sonnel are thus trapped in a meaningless system of minute partition in 
which all thought of the possible use of land to satisfy human needs is lost 
in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping.303 
Reforms finally ended further allotment, but could not solve the 
problem of the millions of acres that already had been allotted and con-
tinued to fractionate.304 Further failed attempts were made in the 
I960s to solve the problem.30s By the I980s, according to the Court, the 
average allotted tract had I96 owners and the average owner had undi-
vided interests in fourteen tracts.306 One particularly egregious tract, 
Tract I305 of forty acres, produced $I080 in annual rents and was val-
ued at $8000. It cost the Bureau of Indian Mfairs $I7,560 annually to 
find and pay the 439 owners and manage the property.307 On Tract 
I305, two-thirds of the owners received less than $I in annual rents, one 
third received less than a nickel, and one owner was to receive a penny 
once in I77 years.308 Thus, the Court noted that the fractionation had 
become "extreme" and "extraordinary"309 by the time Congress passed 
the I983 Indian Land Consolidation Act.310 Section 207 of this Act 
302 Id. at 707-08. 
303 78 CONGo REc. II,728 (1934) (speech of Rep. Howard). 
304 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 708; see also John Leavitt, Hodel V. Irving: The Supreme Court's 
Emerging Takings Analysis - A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds Per Acre, 18 ENVTL. L. 
597, 611-12 (1988) (describing the difficulties that the Bureau of Indian Affairs faces in selling or 
leasing allotments today); Suzanne S. Schmid, Case Comment, Escheat of Indian Land as a Fifth 
Amendment Taking in Hodel v. Irving: A New Approach to Inheritance?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 
741-42 (1989) C'The fractionation of individually owned Indian trust or restricted land represents 
one of the outstanding problems in Indian law."). 
305 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 708-09. 
306 See id. at 712. 
307 See id. at 713. In 1934, John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, noted: 
[T]he Indian Service is forced to expend millions of dollars a year. The expenditure does not 
and cannot save the land, or conserve the capital accruing from land sales or from rent-
als .... For the Indians the situation is necessarily one of frustration, of impotent discontent. 
They are forced into the status of a landlord class, yet it is impossible for them to control 
their own estates; and the estates are insufficient to yield a decent living, and the yield di-
minishes year by year and finally stops altogether. 
Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Af-
fairs, 73d Congo II 7-18 (1934). 
308 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713. 
309 See id. at 712. 
310 Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit. 2, 96 Stat. 2517 (1983). 
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tried to consolidate these overly fractionated parcels by providing for 
small allotment interests to escheat to the tribe on the owner's death.311 
Once governments create anticommons property, it may be difficult 
for them to redefine rights without either paying compensation or suf-
fering a blow to their credibility. In the American constitutional con-
text, given current takings jurisprudence, the Court found Hodel to be a 
relatively easy case. The regulation was unconstitutional because Con-
gress made no provision for compensating Native Americans when they 
regulated away the possibility of devise and descent of small undivided 
property interests in allotted lands.312 The Court held that "the regula-
tion here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a 
certain type of property - the small undivided interest - to one's 
heirs."313 Because the Court considered the fractionated interest to be 
ordinary private property, it took away one potential mechanism by 
which the government could reassemble allotted land into usable form. 
In I984, while Hodel was pending, Congress made several changes 
to § 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act in an attempt to ensure 
the statute's constitutionality.314 The Hodel Court expressed no opinion 
on the amended § 207.315 However, the Ninth Circuit struck down this 
new attempt to overcome the tragedy of the allotment anticommons,316 
a decision that the Supreme Court recently affirmed.317 It is difficult to 
imagine how Congress or the Native American tribes can overcome the 
tragedy of the allotment anticommons.318 One must wonder how these 
resources will be returned to productive use.319 
V. CONCLUSION 
Anticommons property is prone to the tragedy of underuse. Once 
anticommons property appears, neither markets nor subsequent regula-
tion will reliably convert it into useful private property, even if the 
311 See id. at 2519. 
312 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717-18. 
313 [d. at 716. 
314 See Indian Land Consolidation Act, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1984); see also 
Babbitt v. Youpee, II7 S. Ct. 727, 731 (1997) (listing three relevant amendments to section 207). 
315 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710 n.l. 
316 See Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194, 196 (9th Cir. 1995). 
317 See Babbitt, II7 S. Ct. at 733 C'The narrow revisions Congress made to § 207, without bene-
fit of our ruling in [riling, do not warrant a disposition different than the one this Court announced 
and explained in [riling."). 
318 By analogy to the Quaker Oats Big Inch example, one solution to fractionation of Indian 
lands could be the imposition of property taxes. However, as the Court in Babbitt noted, "Indian 
lands were not subject to state real estate taxes, ... which ordinarily serve as a strong disincentive 
to retaining small fractional interests in land." !d. 
319 In a conversation with the author, Don Herzog suggested that non-use of allotted lands need 
not be viewed as tragic. Ironically, the government might have created a legal regime that inadver-
tently preserves Native American conceptions of trusteeship over nature, not ownership, use, and 
exploitation. This alternative view suggests that the idea of "underuse" may assume the values of a 
pre-existing market economy. 
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property rights are "clearly defined" and contracts are subject to the 
"rule of law." 'fransaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may pre-
vent economically justified conversion from taking place. Over time, 
markets may develop formal or informal mechanisms that allow rights-
bundling entrepreneurs to assemble private or quasi-private property. 
More directly, governments can tinker with the rights regime through 
policy reforms to change individual incentives in favor of bundling, or 
they can risk the instability that comes from revoking excessive rights of 
exclusion. However, this Article has shown that once anticommons 
property has emerged, both markets and governments may fail to re-
bundle it into usable private property. 
Governments must take care to avoid creating anticommons prop-
erty accidentally when they defme new property rights. One path to 
well-functioning private property is to convey a core bundle of rights to 
a single owner, rather than rights of exclusion to multiple owners. Sub-
sequently, owners of standard bundles may fragment their ownership. 
Well-functioning market legal systems allow this conversion, but have 
numerous safeguard mechanisms to ensure that rights can be reb un died 
and the property can be put to use within a reasonable period. When 
these mechanisms fail, anticommons property can become entrenched, 
even in developed market economies. 
Property theory and transition practice have given insufficient 
weight to the role that the bundling of rights plays in avoiding anti-
commons tragedy. Both theorists and practitioners assume that the key 
to creating private property is to define rights clearly, enforce contracts 
predictably, and let the market sort out entitlements. The experience of 
anticommons property in transition suggests that the content of prop-
erty bundles, and not just the clarity of property rights, matters more 
than we have realized. We pay a high price when we inadvertently cre-
ate anticommons property. 
